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A Process of Denial: Bork and 
Post-Modern Conservatism 
James Boyle· 
[I]t is naive to suppose that the [Supreme] Court's present difficul-
ties could be cured by appointing Justices determined to give the 
Constitution "its true meaning," to work at "finding the law" 
instead of reforming society. The possibility implied by these com-
forting phrases does not exist. . . . History can be of considerable 
help, but it tells us much too little about the specific intentions of the 
men who framed, adopted and ratified the great clauses. The record 
is incomplete, the men involved often had vague or even conflicting 
intentions, and no one foresaw, or could have foreseen, the disputes 
that changing social conditions and outlooks would bring before the 
Court. 
Robert Bork 1 
INTRODUCTION 
As you might guess from the title, Robert Bork's latest work, The 
Tempting of America, 2 is a book about the Fall-both America's and Mr. 
Bork's own. It will not surprise many readers to. find that the two are 
linked, or that the "temptation" to which Mr. Bork refers is that of poli-
tics. In particular, he warns us of an increasing politicization of the 
American legal system. This politicization is caused primarily by judges 
who desert the original understanding of the Constitution and, under the 
guise of "interpretation," attempt instead to impose their own individual 
notions of justice on the cases before them. Mr. Bork conveys these 
messages in a book which is part autobiography and part legal theory, 
inspired by the ordeal which brought him to fame: the Senate's judicial 
confirmation process. In his case, of course, it was actually a process of 
denial. Unfortunately, so is the book. 
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Although this article was prompted by the publication of The Tempt-
ing of America, its subject is wider than that book alone. As I went fur-
ther back into Mr. Bork's intellectual history, I discovered that the 
arguments in his most recent book followed a formula developed in his 
earlier writings. Like The Tempting of America, Mr. Bork's other works 
follow a lapsarian pattern-a tale of a fall from grace, coupled with a 
strategy for redemption. Mr. Bork identifies a state of corruption and 
decay in some institution or area oflaw. He traces the rot to a particular 
departure from the proper state of affairs, a willful violation of an author-
itatively decreed scheme of things. He then prescribes a method which 
will allow us to escape our current fallen state and return to a condition 
of righteousness. Mr. Bork speaks strongly in favor of his method, pro-
nouncing it "inescapable" or "unavoidable." Yet it is obvious that Mr. 
Bork's panacea has all the same features as the disease it is supposed to 
cure, despite Mr. Bork's lengthy and thunderous denial that this is the 
case. Eventually, he falls silent for a while, only to emerge two or three 
years later with some new, and newly ineluctable, redemptive method. 
The process then repeats itself. Readers familiar only with Mr. Bork's 
most recent writings will be surprised to find that in the past he has been, 
successively, a believer in libertarianism, process theory, judicial 
restraint, natural rights, neutral principles, law and economics, and two 
distinct forms of originalism. At the time, each of these theories was 
offered as the only possible remedy to the SUbjectivity and arbitrariness of 
value judgements in a constitutional democracy, while the other theories 
he had held, or was about to hold, were rejected out of hand. 
The Tempting of America is, in one sense, the weakest and most obvi-
ously flawed of Mr. Bork's panaceas. He criticizes contemporary liberal 
constitutional jurisprudence for being arbitrary, politically biased, inde-
terminate, and ahistorical. Yet his prescription for cure--the philosophy 
of original understanding-is even more obviously flawed in these ways. 
Indeed, as the quotation at the beginning of this piece demonstrates, in 
an earlier incarnation he himself dismissed originalism as "naive." Mr. 
Bork's rhetoric of denial must be correspondingly stronger and more 
thunderous. Yet in another sense, The Tempting of America marks a 
departure, albeit a fragmentary and contradictory one, from the endless 
process of denial. It reveals a shift to a different form of conservative 
thought, one that could be called pre-modem, or even post-modem. For 
these reasons, among others, it behooves us to pay more attention to Mr. 
Bork's most recent argument than its surface confusion and dogma 
might first appear to deserve. 
I 
Every Eden has its own forbidden fruit, its own great serpents. Mr. 
Bork's forbidden fruit is politics, his serpents are the members of a liberal 
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elite in legal academia. More broadly, the villains of the piece are those 
in the "intellectual or knDwledge class," "who work, however adroitly or 
maladroitly, with words and ideas" (p. 8). This class "tend[s] to have 
values antagonistic to a traditional, bourgeois society. It is not too much 
to say that these people see the Constitution as a weapon in a class strug-
gle about social and political values" (p. 8). Despite the fact that he 
appears to work (however adroitly or maladroitly) with words and ideas, 
Mr. Bork is not a card-carrying member of this knowledge class. Like 
Karl Marx, he has managed to escape from the class-determined atti-
tudes he describes. 
Mr. Bork's plot is a relatively simple one. The knowledge class comes 
to realize that the values of the real Constitution (as interpreted by the 
Framers, their contemporary audience, and Mr. Bork) are hostile to their 
predilection for sexual freedom and egalitarian social reform. Unwilling 
to accept this limitation on their desires, they decide3 to subvert the true 
meaning of the document. They have a number of strategies to achieve 
this goal, including political opposition to judges who do not share their 
ideas of the Constitution. Understandably, Mr. Bork thinks this a partic-
ularly pernicious thing to do. But the liberal elite are not content merely 
to block those with whom they disagree. They wish to transform consti-
tutional debate, to marginalize originalism by treating it as just one 
method of interpretation among many, perhaps to root it out altogether. 
The knowledge class receives help in its "heresy" (p. 7) from a number of 
well-meaning but unsophisticated judges who yearn to do justice, from a 
public unwilling to listen to discussions of constitutional theory, and 
from a perverse judicial tendency, as old as Marbury v. Madison, occa-
sionally to ignore the manifest good sense of the philosophy of original 
understanding. 
The knowledge class's success has cost the law dearly in terms of legit-
imacy. "Since the politicization of law has, for half a century, moved 
results steadily to the left, a very large number of Americans do not like 
those outcomes" (p. 2). The Tempting of America is, in effect, a clarion 
call to warn the general public of the dangers of continuing down this 
road and to rally Americans around the flag of originalism. It should be 
noted that originalism does not mean original intent. Mr. Bork used to 
think it blindingly obvious that the Constitution's true meaning was 
determined by the original intent of the Framers. Now he finds it equally 
obvious that the Framers' intentions are irrelevant and that the true 
meaning of the Constitution is determined by the way it would have been 
understood by the Framers' contemporaries. This new position is so 
3. I use the word advisedly. Despite occasional comments to the contrary, Mr. Bork seems to 
envisage a set of conscious actions to "subvert" the Constitution, rather than the unconscious 
working out of a set of class-based ideas and attitudes. In this respect, of course, he parts company 
with Marx. 
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obvious to Mr. Bork that he doesn't mind imposing it on candidates for 
the jUdiciary. Indeed, "[o]ne purpose of this book is to persuade Ameri-
cans that no person should be nominated or confirmed who does not 
display both a grasp of and devotion to the philosophy of original under-
standing" (p. 9). At this point, one might legitimately ask Mr. Bork, 
"Isn't this the very thing for which you castigate the liberals? Isn't this 
the imposition of a politically-based loyalty oath for judicial method?" 
Mr. Bork's response seems to boil down to an assertion that his method, 
unlike those the liberals seek to impose, is right. 
It would be a mistake to end our reading of Mr. Bork with this realiza-
tion, however. His arguments may be shallow, dogmatic, ahistorical, 
logically flawed, and inconsistent with his own past writings. But this is 
only part of the story. This book reveals a great deal about the relation-
ship between conservative ideology and the law, an issue which, given the 
current composition of the federal bench, will continue to be of consider-
able interest. The Tempting of America will take its place as the leading 
exposition of the philosophy of original understanding. For reasons I will 
give later, originalism is likely to be the only conservative legal theory 
with significant appeal to a mass audience. Thus, Mr. Bork's book has 
considerable political and iconographic significance. 
The significance of the book becomes even clearer if we focus on the 
two warring sides of Mr. Bork's argument. The first and most obvious is 
an unsuccessful but relatively conventional attempt to satisfy the require-
ments of liberal rationalist social thought. In other words, he attempts to 
prove that the theory of original understanding is neutral, objective, 
unprejudiced and, in general, a rational analysis of the social world. The 
second and less obvious side of the book is the more interesting. Scat-
tered throughout this work. are fragmentary arguments and statements 
which, if pieced together, represent a fundamental conservative challenge 
to the framework of liberal rationalism, the very framework into which 
Mr. Bork has been trying to shoehorn his ideas. This challenge could be 
described as Burkean conservatism. Or, given its low opinion of the 
value of rationality, its critique of liberal epistemology, and its cut-and-
paste approach to historical tradition, it could with equal justice be called 
"post-modern conservatism." Because it does not fit within the ruling 
epistemology, most readers will not even recognize this second argument 
as an argument. It is exactly for that reason that it deserves our 
attention. 
Mr. Bork's book presents us-albeit in confused and contradictory 
form-with a strand of conservatism long neglected in the United States, 
a strand often identified with its most famous proponent, Edmund 
Burke. Thus, it gives us the opportunity to examine a striking historical 
parallel. Writing against the French Revolution, at the beginning of "the 
Age of Reason," Burke spoke out in favor of established hierarchies and 
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a-rational tradition, and against the "delusive plausibilities of moral poli-
ticians."4 He argued that the attempt to understand the social world 
using only the "fallible and feeble" tools of reason was marked by both 
hubris and danger. Mr. Bork, writing in a post-modem era hailed by 
some as the twilight of reason, strikes exactly the same chords, though 
with less style and assurance. Is this a return to a pre-modem (or even 
the rise of a post-modem) conservatism?!! 
I will begin this article by discussing Mr. Bork's importance to current 
conservative legal theory.6 After concluding that the theory of original 
intent (and to a lesser degree, of original understanding) is one of the 
most popularly acceptable of the available conservative legal theories, I 
will devote the middle portion of the article to an examination of the 
intellectual odyssey which led Mr. Bork to make his way through each of 
those theories before holding the ideas he does now. I will prove, in fact, 
that Mr. Bork is the only conservative legal theorist who has held every 
conservative legal theory. Having shown how Mr. Bork developed his 
recent ideas about original understanding, I will assess their interpretive, 
historical, and logical merits. After demonstrating that Mr. Bork's most 
recent theory fails on all counts, I will discuss the structure that it has in 
common with his earlier work. Finally, using that structure as a tool, I 
will develop the part of his current ideas which challenges the epistemol-
ogy of liberal rationalism and discuss its possible significance for con-
servative thought in general. 
II. BORK AND CONSERVATIVE LEGAL THEORY 
There have been enormous strides in conservative legal theory in 
4. Burke, infra note 85, at 125. 
5. As the reader will gather from this article, my interest is less in intellectual taxonomy, than in 
exploring certain similar challenges which both pre-modem (republican, Burkean) and post-modem 
thought present to the tradition of liberal rationalism. For the post-modem side of the story see 
HASSAN, POST modernISM' A Paracritical Bibliography, in PARACRITICISMS: SEVEN 
SPECULATIONS OF THE TIMES 39 (1973); J. KRISTEVA, DESIRE IN LANGUAGE (L. Roudiez ed. 
1979). Post-modem work is marked by a skepticism about the limits of abstract, rational discourse 
(see, e.g. J. DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976», and about the accuracy of political theories 
built around the notion of "the subject," a rights-holding individual divorced from culture, tradition, 
language, and history (see, e.g., M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS (1976». Stylistically it 
tends to rely on what David Kennedy calls "ironic conformity"-recreating tradition and history 
even as it uses them. Interestingly, Burkean conservatism is also marked by these three 
characteristics, although it is, of course, very different in other ways-stodgier in sentiment, more 
reactionary in declared political vision, less pretentious in persona, and infinitely superior in writing 
style. At first, the similarity seems bizarre. A moment's thought supplies a possible reason. Since 
each of these three characteristics was developed largely out of opposition to the dominant 
epistemology and political tradition of the Age of Reason, it is hardly surprising that they are 
encountered in works from both the beginning and the supposed end of that tradition. See Boyle, 
The Politics of Reason, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985). Having pointed out that both Burkean and 
post-modem thought present a challenge to some of liberal rationalism'S fundamental premises, 
rather than an argument within those premises, I have exhausted my interest in intellectual 
taxonomy and the reader need fear no further footnotes like this one. 
6. In order to avoid endless quibbles about definition, I use the term "conservative" to refer to 
those who would use that term, among others, to describe their own political views. 
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recent years. They were sorely needed. With some notable exceptions, 7 
conservative legal thought once consisted largely of bombast, red-baiting, 
and formalism. In the last fifteen years, that situation has changed dra-
matically. A number of distinct schools of conservative legal thought 
have appeared, providing conservative judges, administrators, and policy 
makers with a wealth of contradictory but persuasive advice on how best 
to use their newly-acquired power. The Tempting of America is best read 
as the leading statement of one of these schools. To understand its 
importance we must first look at the competition. 
One of the most obvious contributions to conservative legal theory 
comes from the economic analysis of law. The Chicago school of law 
and economics has reconceptualized the legal system as a "rights mar-
ket," where decision makers are asked to allocate rights to the person 
who would pay the most for them under conditions of perfect competi-
tion.8 This has the happy effect offavoring the rich over the poor, and all 
in the name of science. It also means that we can extend the ideology of 
the market to the last few areas, such as adoption, civil rights and the 
criminal law, which still have the temerity to resist it. In case anyone 
should imagine that this is merely an academic movement, it should be 
remembered that its chief proponent is now a federal judge. It is also 
instructive, if not actually frightening, to find that half of all federal 
judges have already attended corporate-funded courses in law and eco-
nomics, arousing considerable concern over the ethical propriety of their 
actions. 
Alternatively, for those less enamored of the dismal science, there are 
libertarian legal theories. Libertarians place the takings clause at the 
center of the Constitution, and read it broadly to cover much of govern-
mental activity. "All regulations, all taxes, and all modifications of lia-
bility rules are takings of private property prima facie compensable by 
the state."9 They argue that the jUdiciary should move towards a mini-
malist state by striking down everything within the broad reach of the 
takings clause. This analysis results in the conclusion that the New Deal 
is unconstitutional, as are the minimum wage, worker's compensation, 
rent control, social security and progressive taxation. Sadly, the liberta-
rian concern for takings of private property does not extend to those who 
have suffered the greatest losses in the past-Native Americans and Afri-
can Americans in particular. 
7. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962). 
8. See R. POSNER, THE EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1986); M. POLINSKY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO EcONOMIC ANALYSIS (1989); Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of 
Law, 5 J. PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1975); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A 
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981); Boyle, The Politics of Reason: Critical Legal Studies and 
Local Social Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685 (1985). 
9. R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DoMAIN 95 
(1985). 
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Both law and economics and libertarianism require a degree of "judi-
cial activism" which undermines the notion that conservatives are auto-
matically proponents of "judicial restraint." Nevertheless, some still 
believe that the first job of a conservative legal theory is to limit the 
power of the judiciary. To this end it has been suggested that Congress 
should be capable of overruling federal or Supreme Court decisions, or 
that a seven member majority on the Court should be required to strike 
down federal or state law. 10 Legislation was also proposed which would 
have made it an impeachable offense for federal judges to order govern-
mental expenditures for a specific purpose, when a legislature has not 
authorized and appropriated funds for that purpose. 11 Those who prefer 
brief solutions will like the suggestion that Congress should simply 
remove "controversial political and social questions from the appellate 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.,,12 Since every issue which comes to 
the Supreme Court seems like a controversial social issue to someone, 
such a solution would have the indirect benefit of making a valuable plot 
of real estate on First Street N.E. available for development. 
Social conservatives have been less prominently represented in the 
academy, but no less influential in decision-making. Members of this 
group have led the attack on Roe v. Wade, convinced the Supreme Court 
that there is no constitutional bar to criminalizing all sexual acts beyond 
the heterosexual missionary position, persuaded the Justice Department 
to oppose affirmative action, and held out the possibility that divorce 
should be restricted and perhaps abolished. "In a case of a traditional 
church marriage, where the couple has exchanged the usual vows 'for 
richer or poorer, in sickness and in health, till death us do part', there is 
no reason why they should not be held to their contract.,,13 A passage 
from the same work gives some notion of the social conservative attitude 
towards equal opportunity law and women's rights. 
The strains imposed on the family by equal opportunity are enor-
mous-husbands competing with their own wives, men and women 
entering into marriage "so long as love shall last," mothers feeling 
compelled to abandon their families for a career or to satisfy their 
sexual appetites. The real effect of this collective delusion of 
women's rights is only to reduce the once sovereign family to a sup-
port system for various governmental agencies. 14 
10. A useful summary of such proposals can be found in Stanmeyer, Judicial Supremacy, in THE 
NEW RIGHT PAPERS 142, 163-65 (R. Whitaker ed. 1982). Professor Stanmeyer is in favor of some, 
but not all, of these suggestions. As his title suggests, his concern is most directly with judicial 
supremacy rather than judicial activism, though it seems clear that he believes the two to be 
integrally related. 
11. [d. at 163. 
12. [d. at 164. 
13. Fleming, Old Rights and the New Right, in THE NEW RIGHT PAPERS 180, 196 (R. Whitaker 
ed. 1982). Dr. Fleming later extends his argument to civil ceremonies. 
14. [d. at 196-97. 
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On the strategic level of national politics, Bork's book is important 
precisely because so many people would find these other conservative 
legal movements to be either too complicated or too wacky. Perhaps 
both. I hasten to say that this is not a judgement about the actual merits 
of conservative ideas. Judge Posner gets justifiably upset when people 
ignore the rest of his brilliant and prodigious opus and focus on only his 
baby-selling article, even comparing his suggestions to Swift's A Modest 
Proposal. There is certainly intellectual substance to the idea that mar-
kets ration scarce resources----in this case, babies----better than do bureau-
cracies. Nevertheless, there is an undeniable reaction of moral and 
emotional outrage at economic discussions of the efficient level of crime 
or the economics of the baby shortage. The depth of outrage at sugges-
tions like this makes it likely that, as a popular national platform for 
conservative legal reform, law and economics has even less of a chance 
than bimetallism. Behind the scenes, of course, it is likely to be more and 
more important. 
As for the libertarian ideal, it is certainly true that property exercises a 
peculiar fascination over the affections of mankind. Nevertheless, it is 
hard to imagine a popular political or legal movement built around the 
idea that the New Deal is unconstitutional, or that the takings clause is 
the center of the Constitution. An unalloyed philosophy of judicial 
restraint is also unlikely to have much appeal, either to the public or to 
conservative judges revelling in their new found powers. 
When it comes to social conservatism, I have found that a lot of Amer-
icans, and not merely the members of Mr. Bork's knowledge class, have a 
yen for sexual freedom and "the delusion of women's rights." The 
author who used that phrase and then suggested abolishing divorce, 
described his creed in the following way; "when a Southerner calls him-
self a conservative, he is usually thinking of a way of life, of a social and 
moral order for which the people of the 1860's went to war."lS Correct 
me if I am wrong, but wasn't the name of that social and moral order 
"slavery?" While I can believe much of American politics, I cannot 
believe that slavery, or baby-selling, or even the abolition of the New 
Deal (shortly followed by the Supreme Court) would form the basis of an 
extraordinarily popular conservative legal movement. And that is where 
Mr. Bork comes in. 
Mr. Bork's book is tailor-made for popular appeal. It is weighty 
enough to convince those who are not familiar with the material he dis-
cusses, and shallow enough to be capable of quick summary in a talk 
show or newspaper article. As I will show in the next section, the argu-
ments against Mr. Bork's ideas are overwhelming, but sometimes compli-
cated or dependent on a base of detailed historical knowledge. For these 
15. Id. at 184. 
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reasons, the opposing arguments are unlikely to fare well in the orgy of 
narcissism, cliche, and half truth which masquerades as public debate on 
the nation's airwaves. But any detailed, scholarly, or merely honest anal-
ysis of Mr. Bork's ideas reveals a jurisprudence of dogma and sound-bites 
and a version of history which bears the same relationship to the 
Framer's ideas that Busch Gardens bears to Europe. 
In one view, perhaps the dominant view, Mr. Bork's most recent book 
is an alternately defensive and opportunistic response to his confirmation 
hearings. The story goes something like this: Mr. Bork is a thoughtful 
legal scholar and must surely recognize the problems with his theory. He 
himself used to criticize originalism, before it became flavor of the month 
at the Justice Department. Yet consider the alternatives open to him. 
He can acknowledge that his theory of constitutional interpretation is 
both incoherent and unworkable. But to do so would be to legitimate the 
painful criticism to which he was subject during the hearings. Alterna-
tively, he can turn his back on scholarship and real history, becoming 
instead a revered video pundit of the right, bearing the scars of honorable 
battle and a theory that can be explained between commercial breaks. 
Who can be surprised when he chooses the latter course? Who can be 
surprised to find that his theory fails to confront the objections raised to 
it? Who can be surprised that his book consists instead of a process of 
denial--denial of philosophical problems, historical problems, logical 
problems, and finally, denial of personal inconsistency? 
Yet there is another way of viewing this book. Perhaps The Tempting 
of America should not be seen as the defensive and disingenuous product 
of the confirmation hearings. Instead, it may best be seen as the culmina-
tion of a prominent conservative's intellectual odyssey, the end of a trek 
through each of the prevalent schools of conservative legal thought. In 
the next section I will suggest that Mr. Bork has measured each of the 
ideas he has held by its ability to offer a coherent conservative vision of 
how a society is to be run if values are not subject to rational discussion. 
If this is true, then the fact that he ends up with the theory of original 
understanding is particularly fascinating. What does originalism, which 
seems the weakest of the conservative theories, offer that the others do 
not? 
III. Is BORK A BORKEAN? 
Mr. Bork has had a colorful career. Before becoming a judge, he was a 
practicing lawyer, a Yale law professor, and then a Solicitor General of 
the United States. His term in the latter office "included some duties not 
listed in [the] job description, among them writing briefs against Vice 
President Spiro Agnew ... and the firing of Special Prosecutor Archibald 
Cox in what was known as the Saturday night massacre" (p. 272). Cer-
tain members of the knowledge class suggested during Mr. Bork's confir-
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mation hearings that the latter act did not reflect well upon him. He 
feels, however, that "[t]hese are stories that may be left for another time" 
(Id. ). I will bow to his wishes, turning instead to the changes in his 
intellectual position over the last twenty-five years. 
Mr. Bork's intellectual history is a fascinating odyssey through all of 
the major theories of twentieth century conservative legal thought. At 
one time or another, Mr. Bork has held them all-and always passion-
ately. In this sense, he is a conservative Everyman, and his odyssey 
presents the development of conservative legal thought in microcosm. 
This makes his current position all the more interesting. 
In 1963, when conservatives were worried that Congress might force 
whites to open their hotels and restaurants to Blacks, Mr. Bork was a 
libertarian with a high regard for individual freedom of association. He 
had this to say about the Interstate Accommodations Act: 
The legislature would inform a substantial body of the citizenry that 
in order to carry on the trades in which they are established they 
must deal with and serve persons with whom they do not wish to 
associate .... The fact that the coerced scale of preferences is said to 
be rooted in a moral order does not alter the impact upon freedom. 
In a society that purports to value freedom as an end in itself, the 
simple argument from morality to law can be a dangerous non 
sequitur .... The principle of such legislation is that if I find your 
behavior ugly by my standards, moral or aesthetic, and if you prove 
stubborn about adopting my view of the situation, I am justified in 
having the state coerce you into more righteous paths. That is itself 
a principle of unsurpassed ugliness. 16 
Five years later, when he published Why I Am For Nixon,1' and The 
Supreme Court Needs A New Phiiosophy,18 Mr. Bork's judicial philoso-
phy was largely cast in the form of a critique of the Warren Court, whose 
result-oriented jurisprudence had tempted judges with a knowledge they 
were forbidden to possess. The latter article is particularly interesting. 
In it, Mr. Bork argued that "[t]he Warren Court ... challenges us to 
think again whether there is or can be any substance to the distinction 
between law and politics."19 The article goes in search of some theoreti-
cal basis for that distinction. Bork concluded that it is "naive" to take 
the position which he now espouses, that is, to insist simply that the 
Court "give the Constitution its 'true meaning.' The possibility implied 
by those comforting phrases does not exist."20 In a passage which will 
16. Bork, Civil Rights-A Challenge, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 31, 1963, at 21. 
17. Bork, Why I Am For Nixon, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June I, 1968, at 19. 
18. Bork, The Supreme Court Needs a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968, at 138. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 140. 
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surely surprise some of his more recent readers, Bork even quoted Robert 
Penn Warren for the truth of the legal realist view of law. 
Every thoughtful working lawyer has shared the insight expressed 
by Willy Stark, the Huey Long-like politician in All the King's Men 
and a legal realist if ever there was one. "The law," he said, "is like 
a single-bed blanket on a double bed and three folks in the bed and a 
cold night. There ain't ever enough blanket to cover the case, no 
matter how much pulling and hauling." The question, then, is not 
whether courts should make law, but how and from what 
materials?l 
Answering his own question, Mr. Bork tried and rejected a number of 
alternative "materials." Relying on the traditional materials, "the text 
of the Constitution, history and precedent," will not solve the realist 
dilemma. "[S]ometimes they dictate results. But more often these 
sources suggest that the Court must enter a field and yet do not answer 
the important questions found there." Probably the most striking pas-
sage is the one quoted at the beginning of this article, in which Bork 
specifically rejects the originalist position. 
History can be of considerable help, but it tells us much too little 
about the specific intentions of the men who framed, adopted, and 
ratified the great clauses. The record is incomplete, the men 
involved often had vague or even conflicting intentions, and no one 
foresaw, or could have foreseen, the disputes that changing social 
conditions and outlooks would bring before the Court. 22 
Bork concluded that Willy Stark and the Yale legal realists were "dead 
right about the inadequacy of the traditional sources of law.'>23 
The new philosophy Mr. Bork offered was an interesting hybrid. It 
was a kind of process theory which combined an argument like Bickel's 
for judicial restraint with a Wechslerian argument for judicial activism 
when necessary to safeguard deductively-generated "natural rights." 
Mr. Bork stitched these disparate elements together with his usual con-
viction and self-assurance. 
Where the Constitution does not thrust it into a field, a restrained 
Supreme Court would deal with the processes by which the policies 
of representative institutions are made and applied, rather than with 
the substance of the policies. Intervention coupled with refusal to 
pass on substance does not entail a contradiction. . . . In his book 
The Least Dangerous Branch, Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale 
has analyzed the rich and subtle repertory of judicial techniques 
available to educate, to frame, and to expose issues for other 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 141. 
23. Id. 
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branches of government, to require them to face up to hard choices 
and their consequences. Restraint entails not so much a reduced as 
a different role for the Court, one better suited to democratic society 
than the role now played by the Warren Court.24 
The traditional conservative's preference for judicial restraint is sub-
ject to the Madisonian imperative that the court intervene in order to 
protect minorities from majorities. 
A desire for some legitimate form of judicial activism is inherent in a 
tradition that runs strong in our culture, a tradition that can be 
called "Madisonian." We continue to believe that there are some 
things no majority should be allowed to do to us, no matter how 
democratically it may decide to do them. . . . [T]here are some 
aspects of life a majority should not control . . . coercion in such 
matters is tyranny, a violation of the individual's natural rights .... 
Clearly, the definition of natural rights cannot be left to either the 
majority or the minority. . . . This requires the Court to have, and 
demonstrate the validity of, a theory of natural rights.25 
The theory of natural rights turns out to be more "conventional" than 
"natural." "Working in the method familiar to lawyers trained in the 
common law, the judge can construct principles that explain existing 
constitutional rights and extrapolate from them to define new natural 
rights."26 Having rejected as "naive" a search for the historically defined 
lines the elder Mr. Bork will find so easily, the younger Mr. Bork offers 
less tangible, "intersubjective" constraints on this process. 
In proceeding to derive new rights, the courts must be controlled by 
the methods and disciplines that lawyers call craftsmanship. . . . 
Only in this way, so far as I can see, can we begin to meet the plea 
made by Professor Herbert Wechsler of Columbia for "neutral prin-
ciples" of constitutionallaw.27 
If readers are a little surprised by this realist, activist Bork, who began 
his analysis from the necessity of courts making law, they will also be 
surprised by the "neutral" set of natural rights he managed to "derive." 
In 1968, it was obvious to Mr. Bork that the first amendment, correctly 
interpreted, protected not only political but also non-political speech.28 
The implications, however, went much further: 
[N]on-political speech too, of course, is entitled to some degree of 
constitutional protection. Brandeis cited other values of speech that 
are not unique to the political variety. For both speaker and hearer, 
speech may be a source of enjoyment, of self-fulfillment, of personal 
24. Id. at 166, 168. 
25. Id. at 168-70. 
26. Id. at 170. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 168-70. 
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development. It is often mundane or vulgar or self-serving, but it 
may be exalted, inspired by the highest motives. It may affect atti-
tudes that ultimately impinge on the political process. All this has 
implications that, though generally overlooked, seem inescapable. 
For in these respects nonpolitical speech does not differ from non-
verbal behavior, whether it customarily bears the label "sexual," 
"economic," "artistic," or some other. One could argue, then, that 
all human behavior should be entitled to the same level of constitu-
tional consideration, the same judicial scrutiny of governmental regu-
lation, that is currently afforded to nonpolitical speech. 29 
After generalizing first amendment protection to all human behavior, 
Mr. Bork modestly offered a way to draw a line between the wishes of the 
majority and the rights of the minority. 
[M]oral disapproval alone cannot be accepted as a sufficient ration-
ale for any coercion. . . . The Court can draw a line, applicable to 
many more situations than the "right of privacy" enunciated in 
Griswold, by ruling that the majority may prohibit morally or aes-
thetically offensive nonpolitical behavior where the public must 
observe it, but cannot reach conduct out of sight on such a rationale. 
Both majority and minority may feel some pain at their respective 
limitations, but the line does preserve an enclave of freedom while 
minimizing the pain felt by the majority.30 
There is a certain poignancy in this confident display of Mr. Bork's 
libertarian persona, akin to the feeling one has looking at photographs of 
a doomed individual, still full of vigor, unaware of the fate that awaits 
him. By 1990, Mr. Bork would believe that a majority must legislate 
morality if it is not to "dissolve social bonds" (p. 249). In 1968, however, 
he could hardly have championed libertarianism more vigorously. At 
that moment, a constitutional order created by Mr. Bork would probably 
have resembled Professor Epstein's world, where "all regulations, all 
taxes, and all modifications of liability rules are takings of private prop-
erty prima facie compensable by the state"3! and where the acceptable 
reasons for state intervention in individual behavior are few indeed. This 
position is the logical conclusion of the ideas Bork held in 1963 when he 
wrote that the prohibition of racial exclusion in public lodging embodied 
a "principle of unsurpassed ugliness"32 because it interfered with individ-
ualliberty. It is hardly surprising, then, that five years later, he thought 
it "inescapable" that all human behavior should be granted constitu-
tional protection of the same kind as non-political speech. The quotation 
above is perhaps the clearest example of the direction of his thought. 
29. [d. at 170 (emphasis added). 
30. [d. at 174. 
31. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 9. 
32. Bork, supra note 16. 
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Notice how careful he is to carve out a sphere of private action free from 
public moral regulation. The majority can interfere on moral grounds 
only in what it can see, and even then there is lower level first amend-
ment protection. The implications of this position are dramatic. Using 
this sort of analysis, Bowers v. Hardwicp3 would certainly be overruled, 
and there would be an overwhelmingly strong argument in support of 
Roe v. Wade. 34 
But after this five-year period of holding to the same line, Mr. Bork's 
peripatetic intellect was straining at the leash. By 1971, the libertarian 
side of Mr. Bork's ideas had crumbled, while reliance on Wechsler's the-
ory of "neutral principles" had increased. The change was hardly subtle. 
Nevertheless Bork described each of his different positions as unavoida-
ble. Three years earlier he had believed it inescapable that the first 
amendment covered all human behavior. Yet in his 1971 Indiana Law 
Journal article, he could not see how to avoid the conclusion that the first 
amendment covered only political speech, narrowly defined.35 The prin-
ciples of libertarianism seemed to have vanished from his thought. 
Mr. Bork confessed to his change of heart, at least insofar as it implied 
a reversal of his position on Griswold v. Connecticut. In 1968, together 
with other commentators, he had thought that case "a salutary demon-
stration of the Court's ability to protect fundamental human values. "36 
By 1971 Bork thought Griswold an "unprincipled decision," both its der-
ivation and its definition being "utterly specious. ,,37 He offered as 
"extenuation" for his change of heart that "at the time I thought, quite 
erroneously, that new basic rights could be derived logically by finding 
and extrapolating a more general principle of individual autonomy 
underlying the particular guarantees of the Bill of Rights."38 
As Mr. Bork's libertarian sentiments were gradually abandoned for 
33. 478 u.s. 186 (1986) (upholding the Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy). 
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In fact, it is surprising how closely Mr. Bork's ideas mirror those of the 
majority opinion in Roe, particularly in the way that liberty of choice is developed through an idea 
that private choices are immune from majority scrutiny. Despite his later hostility to the "right of 
privacy," Mr. Bork himself thinks that his expansion of the rationale of first amendment doctrine 
goes considerably beyond Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). If economic activity is given 
the protection associated with non-political speech, what about reproductive choice? The same point 
can be made about his hostility to civil rights legislation. If interfering with whites' rights to refuse 
black customers involves a "principle of unsurpassed ugliness," what about interfering with a 
woman's control of her body? Finally, under Mr. Bork's public/private distinction, if an abortion 
were carried on in private, even if a majority found it morally abhorrent, it would be protected. It 
would appear that Mr. Bork's only possible response to this result would be to class abortion as a 
"crime" and thus free it from his libertarian principles. Such a response exposes the circularity in 
both sides of this argument (since the question of classification decides the analysis rather than 
following from it) and also means that he must engage in substantive discussion of individual issues, 
the very thing he claims to a void. 
35. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 35 (1971). 
36. [d. at 8 (citing Bork, supra note 1). 
37. Bork. supra note 35, at 9. His disillusionment did not stop there. Nineteen years later, 
Griswold seemed to him "a constitutional time bomb," id. at 95, a case that rivalled Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, infra note 79, in its awfulness. 
38. [d. at 8. 
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"neutral principles," his ideas about interpretation were undergoing a 
similar metamorphosis. In 1968 Mr. Bork had thought it "naive" to 
imagine we could solve our problems merely by appointing judges deter-
mined to give the Constitution its "true meaning." "The possibility 
implied by these comforting phrases does not exist. .. ."39 He had specif-
ically pointed out that an originalist historical search told us "too little 
about the specifics." At that time, he gave as an example the difficulty of 
determining the level of generality of the Fourteenth Amendment. "His-
tory shows us that the equal protection clause (ratified a few years after 
the Civil War) grew out of a concern about racial equality, but in crucial 
respects the record leaves us unsure what was meant by equality and how 
far beyond race the guarantee was intended to reach."4O Does it mandate 
"black equality," "racial equality," or some wider vision? By 1971, his-
tory had become considerably clearer, so that Mr. Bork could say "[O]ne 
thing the Court does know: [the fourteenth amendment] was intended to 
enforce a core ideal of black equality against governmental discrimina-
tion.',41 As the years passed, the record was to become clearer still. 
In 1980, Paul Brest made the same criticism of original understanding 
that Bork himself had made in his 1968 article: the approach leaves open 
the level of generality of the constitutional provision, and therefore the 
judge must choose a level of abstraction. When Mr. Bork responds to 
Brest's article in 1990, there is no trace of the methodological problems 
which had once caused him to see indeterminacy in texts, precedents, 
and historical records. "The role of a judge committed to the philosophy 
of original understanding is not to 'choose a level of abstraction.' Rather 
it is to find the meaning of a text-a process which includes finding its 
degree of generality, which is part of its meaning" (p. 149). The method-
ological confidence is accompanied by some interesting substantive con-
victions about equal protection. Women and gays will have to make do 
with a lower-level scrutiny as to whether any discrimination is "reason-
able." In the case of gays, at least, reasonableness will almost always be 
found. "Social treatment of homosexuals is based upon moral concerns 
and it would be difficult to say that the various moral balances struck are 
unreasonable" (p. 150). This is a far cry from the libertarian who wanted 
to broaden the protection offered by Griswold to all human behavior. 
As Mr. Bork's libertarianism waned and his theory of interpretation 
changed, an associated shift in his moral epistemology was taking place. 
Two sentences from his famous Indiana Law Journal article sum it up: 
Unless we can distinguish forms of gratification, the only course for 
a principled court is to let the majority have its way in both 
39. Bork, supra note 18, at 140-41. 
40. [d. 
41. Bork, supra note 35, at 14-15. 
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cases .... There is no principled way to decide that one man's grati-
fications are more deserving of respect than another's or that one 
form of gratification is more worthy than another.42 . 
In a footnote he elaborates: "The impossibility is related to that of mak-
ing interpersonal comparisons of utilities ... 43 The conclusion that econo-
mists draw from this premise is that matters of value must be left to the 
market. In the Indiana article, Mr. Bork argues that they must be left to 
the majority unless trumped by an overriding neutral principle derived 
from the Constitution using the Wechslerian tools of generalization and 
abstraction.44 In The Tempting of America, the formulation is the same 
but the content has changed: questions of value must be left to the major-
ity unless the original understanding produces a principle that trumps 
them. Mr. Bork now has the form of his basic argument, a form that can 
be filled using his method of the moment. 
So far, we have seen Mr. Bork hold most of the available conservative 
legal theories I discussed earlier. He advocated in tum libertarianism, 
traditional judicial restraint, judicial activism to enforce natural rights, 
and Wechsler's theory of neutral principles. The only schools of thought 
missing from the list are the economic analysis of law, social conserva-
tism, and the philosophy of original intent. These, though, were soon to 
follow. 
During this entire period, Mr. Bork had been hard at work on the 
articles later published as The Antitrust Paradox, which was finished in 
1978. The shibboleths of his argument looked reasonably familiar. 
Within the limited frame for observation provided by antitrust, 
therefore, it is worth noting that the general movement has been 
away from legislative decision by Congress and toward political 
choice by courts, away from the idea of competition and toward the 
older idea of protected status for each producer, away from concern 
with general welfare and toward concern for interest groups, and 
away from the ideal of liberty toward the idea of enforced equality.4s 
Mr. Bork believed these trends to be "ultimately incompatible with the 
preservation of a liberal capitalist social order ... 46 His prescription was a 
fascinating one. At first it appears that Mr. Bork was proposing a form 
of originalism in which "political choice by courts" is replaced by "legis-
lative decision by Congress." The question then becomes, "Should the 
antitrust statutes be enforced according to the original intent of Con-
42. Id. at 10. 
43. Id. at n.20. 
44. The Wechslerian method is required because of the vagaries of historical interpretation. Mr. 
Bork is now willing to concede authoritativeness to the power of original intent, but has the same 
critical view of its determinacy. "It is the fact that history does not reveal detailed choices ... that 
permits, indeed requires, resort to other methods of interpretation." Id. at 13. 
45. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). 
46. Id. 
1991] Boyle 279 
gress?" Mr. Bork has some doubts. "Antitrust" he tells us, "is a subcat-
egory of ideology.,,47 
[Its] basic premises are mutually incompatible, and because some of 
them are incorrect, the law has been producing increasingly bizarre 
results. . . . The law must either undergo a difficult process of 
reform, based upon a correct understanding of fundamental legal 
and economic concepts, or resume its descent to the status of an 
internal tariff against domestic competition and free trade.48 
At this point one might wonder where this "correct understanding" 
would come from. A later Mr. Bork would surely rule out any source 
but Congress's actual intentions, no matter how mistaken. Today's Mr. 
Bork would look to the way the statutes were understood at the time of 
passage, and not to subjective intentions. The Mr. Bork of 1968 might 
have believed it possible to "derive" a new antitrust policy "logically by 
finding and extrapolating a more general principle" underlying the "par-
ticular guarantees" of the antitrust statutes, but the Mr. Bork of 1971 
had already pronounced that method erroneous.49 
As it turns out, the source of the "correct understanding" is something 
of a mixture. Much of the basic argument in The Antitrust Paradox is 
historical, but it is a history which serves Mr. Bork's ends. Most histori-
ans would agree that one of the goals of the antitrust rules was to prevent 
the concentration of economic power in American society. Those who 
wrote and passed the statutes believed enormous concentrations of eco-
nomic power to be inherently subversive of the American republic. But 
this is exactly the kind of egalitarian claptrap Mr. Bork will not tolerate. 
Consequently, he feels free to apply the wisdom of modern economic 
analysis to rectify the errors of Congress and the courts. so 
Bork argues that the current principles of antitrust were never con-
firmed empirically, but admits that they do have history on their side. 
"What is true is that our ideas are old; they carry whatever credentials 
time alone can confer. The years 1890 to 1914 witnessed the origin of 
every major theory that drives and directs the evolution of antitrust to 
this day."sl Mr. Bork does not wholly reject the intentions of the fram-
ers. "The concept of legislative intent may be artificial, but it is also 
indispensable. Besides the construct is not wholly arbitrary." S2 But he 
does not want the actual, raw, confused goals that those who passed the 
47. Id. at 3. 
48. Id. at 7. 
49. Bork, supra note 35, at 8. 
50. It is interesting to compare Mr. Bork's current reverence for the original understanding of 
the Constitution with his polite condescension towards the authors of the Robinson-Patman Act, 
who "may well have been moved by an NRA-style philosophy" and an ignorance of economic 
consequences. BORK, supra note 45, at 63. 
51. Id. at 15. 
52. Id. at 57. 
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statutes either had, or were understood at the time to have had. What he 
wants is a legislative intent purified and refined in the fires of modern 
views about economy and society. "A legislature may never address the 
issue of ultimate policy goals and yet write a law whose various catego-
ries and distinctions can be explained only by a particular policy. That 
policy may then quite legitimately be said to have been intended by the 
legislature, even though not a single member articulated it to himself. 53 
From this "not wholly arbitrary" vision of legislative intent and a mod-
em lawyer's vision of microeconomics, Mr. Bork can discern amoung the 
many goals of the antitrust statutes "only one legitimate goal, and that 
goal can be derived as rigorously as any theorem in economics."54 The 
goal is "consumer welfare." It is fascinating to contrast Mr. Bork's 
willingness to supplement the original intention or understanding of the 
antitrust statutes with his advocacy of original understanding in constitu-
tional interpretation. He speaks dismissively of the "primitive state of 
the law's economic doctrines,,55 and moves quickly to deploy the weap-
ons of modem economic analysis. Yet when contemporary legal scholars 
take a similar approach to the Constitution, bringing to higher levels of 
generality principles which have only "whatever credentials time alone 
can confer," or which are thought to be morally reprehensible, Mr. Bork 
considers it the worst kind of sacrilege. 
It is no answer to say that antitrust law is merely statute law. Mr. 
Bork explicitly argues that original understanding applies across the 
board as a legal philosophy. Another possible response would be to 
argue that the original understanding can be supplemented by develop-
ments in a supposedly value-free field such as economics, but not by 
changes in moral attitudes. Even if we accepted the dubious epistemo-
logical premise, this would get Mr. Bork no further. Jim May has 
demonstrated the impossibility of this position. 56 In fact, the authors of 
the antitrust statutes had a perfectly coherent economic theory which 
simply favored values different from those embodied in current theory. 
The statutes and early cases rested not merely on "open-ended SUbjective 
populism" but instead on the classical economics propounded by the 
likes of Wayland and Bowen, and eagerly absorbed by a generation of 
legislators and judges. 57 This vision gave rise to "analyses that, while 
faithful to one generation's economic vision, could be found not only 
53. [d. 
54. [d. at 51. 
55. [d. at 134. 
56. See May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 496 
(1986). 
57. For a more general account of the impact of law on classical and neoclassical economic 
thought, and of economics on law, see Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on 
the Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 939, 940-967 (1985); May, Antitrust in the 
Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis 1880-1918, 50 
OHIO ST. L.J. 258, 258-287 (1989). 
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faulty, but practically unintelligible by a later generation of antitrust ana-
lysts influenced by a very different vision of the nature of economic 
rea1ity.',s8 
If one puts a multi-goal antitrust policy to the test of an economic 
theory which postulates "consumer welfare" as the highest good, it will 
fail. But what happens if, as the philosophy of original understanding 
requires, we test it according to the values of the economic theory reign-
ing at the time? Antitrust policy fares rather better by the lights of classi-
cal economic theory, which guards against the distortion of "natural 
processes" and builds on the indissoluble connection between political 
morality and economics. Even if original understanding does not force 
us to look to the economic wisdom at the time the antitrust statutes were 
written, Mr. Bork has no way of proving that his economics serves pref-
erable values. Why is consumer welfare better than economic decentrali-
zation? "There is no way of deciding these matters other than by 
reference to some system of moral or ethical values that has no objective 
or intrinsic validity of its own and about which men can and do ditfer.',s9 
Mr. Bork is caught once again in nets of his own devising. 
IV. THE FLIGHT FROM VALUE 
The dilemma revealed in this last quotation is the beginning of the 
Ariadne's thread which will lead us through the maze of Mr. Bork's 
ideas. To some, the revelation that Mr. Bork has espoused so many dif-
ferent legal theories, and done so with such vigor, would suggest that he 
is merely a conservative ideologist-for-hire, producing whatever legal 
theory is necessary to win the political debates of the moment. Though I 
deeply disagree with Mr. Bork about almost everything, I think this 
would be unfair. I believe that Mr. Bork's long march through the halls 
of conservative legal theory represents a sincere, almost anguished, 
attempt to deal with a single dilemma: If there is no way of deciding 
matters of legal interpretation except "by reference to some system of 
moral or ethical values that has no objective or intrinsic validity of its 
own," then what of the rule of law itself, or of the line between law and 
politics? 
In my view, this recurring concern is the most important recurring 
theme in Mr. Bork's writings. (Although, as I will argue later, The 
Tempting of America may mark a partial break with the rest of the 
canon.) In Civil Rights-A Challenge, this concern led him to believe 
that Congress had no business overpowering the value judgements of 
racist hotel keepers with value judgements of its own. If value judge-
ments are truly arbitrary, the law should carve out spheres of liberty in 
58. May, supra note 56, at 593. 
59. Dork, supra note 35, at 10. 
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which people can decide for themselves. In The Supreme Court Needs a 
New Philosophy, Mr. Bork's concern was expressed in terms ofa commit-
ment to "process" rather than substantive (and arbitrary) value choice, 
at least in those areas in which the political process functioned well. 
Where it did not, Mr. Bork advocated a craftsmanlike derivation of new 
"natural rights" underlying the liberties which must be protected from 
majorities. Again, those liberties must be protected precisely so that a 
minority could exercise its own arbitrary values in private, free from the 
arbitrary value judgements of the majority. In his Neutral Principles 
article, we see the same concern in a commitment to protecting only 
those rights for which a Wechslerian "neutral principle" could be gener-
ated, and to letting the majority express its unreviewable value judge-
ments everywhere. 
In The Antitrust Paradox that concern leads Mr. Bork, as it has led a 
good many conservatives recently, to reject the contentious and ideologi-
cally loaded choices he saw in the law and to embrace instead the scien-
tific certainties apparently offered by microeconomic analysis. 
Admittedly, Mr. Bork tells us that the microeconomic theory we need is 
not to be confused with the contradictory theories actually produced by 
economists. That belief is an understandable mistake of the lay mind. 
"The layman is likely to think that economic theory is what any econo-
mist theorizes, but of course it is not. If it were, we should have to 
believe that there are dozens or hundreds of mutually incompatible ver-
sions of economic theory, each as good as any other.,,60 That would be 
intolerable because the point of this whole process was to introduce a 
scientific and unchanging criterion, a goal of antitrust that "can be 
derived as rigorously as any theorem in economics." There is no room 
for the suggestion that economics itself might embody unexplained value 
choices or be subject to internal professional dispute. Consequently, "the 
judge, legislator or lawyer cannot simply take the word of an economist 
in dealing with antitrust, for the economists will certainly disagree."61 
When his quest for a constitutional interpretation free from value judg-
ments leads him to seek a foundation in history rather than economics, 
Mr. Bork will take a similarly dismissive view of the kind of history that 
historians produce. 
Here then, is the heart of Mr. Bork's intellectual mission-to offer a 
convincing conservative answer to the central question of liberal society. 
How can we run a society if value judgements are subjective and relative? 
Each of his theories seems to offer the hope of answering this question, 
but each eventually collapses, driving him to the next, "inescapable" set 
of ideas. As a libertarian, he believed we could leave value judgements to 
60. BoRK, supra note 45, at 117. 
61. [d. at 118. 
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individuals, but he encountered the difficulty of drawing the lines inside 
which individuals could exercise their arbitrary values. As an advocate 
of traditional judicial restraint, he believed that those choices could be 
left to the political process, if they were first properly framed by the 
court. Yet he doubted that the line between those issues that the court 
must solve and those that it can leave to another institution could be 
neatly drawn. When he came under the sway of Herbert Wechsler's the-
ory, he accepted that courts might actually decide hard questions pro-
vided they used a principle which is "neutral" as to visions of the good. 
When he wrote The Antitrust Paradox he believed that the value judge-
ments expressed by the legislature could be purified by the scientific wis-
dom of economic analysis, and could thus provide legislative goals as 
rigorously derived as any theorem of economics. His final turn has been 
towards originalism, the theory he once scorned as naive. Originalism 
"solves" the problem of value in constitutional theory by claiming that it 
does no more than apply the Framers' value judgements, and that those 
value judgements are actually historical facts, not values at all. Since 
liberal epistemology accepts the possibility of rational discussion about 
facts, the problem of value for constitutional theory is solved. Or is it? 
V. ORIGINAL INTENT 
The better known variant of originalism, and the one that Mr. Bork 
first adopted and held as recently as 1986, was the philosophy of original 
intent. 62 The Constitution means what the Framers (or perhaps the 
Framers and ratifiers) meant it to. This is the most influential version of 
originalism, the judicial philosophy championed by recent Attorneys 
General. While it may be most popular, it is also the easiest to blowout 
of the water. Listing the arguments against it is the kind of arduous, 
lengthy, and repetitive task which Victorians believed suitable for the 
rehabilitation of convicts. I undertake it here in the hope of acquiring 
virtue. 
First, the idea that the intention of the original author must govern the 
meaning of the text is simply false as both a practical and a philosophical 
matter. In law and in life generally we use many different interpretive 
criteria to establish what something "means." Second, it may well be 
that the only true way to follow the intent of the Framers is by not fol-
lowing their intent. There'is strong historical evidence that the Framers 
did not wish their intentions to bind future generations. Professor H. 
Jefferson Powell has shown, in his article The Original Understanding of 
62. See. e.g., Bork. The Constitution. Original Intent and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 823 (\ 986). "I wish to demonstrate that original intent is the only legitimate basis for 
constitutional decision making." Id. "The only way that the Constitution can constrain judges is if 
the judges interpret the document's words according to the intentions of those who drafted, 
proposed, and ratified its provisions and various amendments." Id. at 826. 
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Original Intent,63 that the Framers had a vision of interpretation gov-
erned by the traditional hermeneutic methods of the common law rather 
than by the simple notion of original intent. Third, records we do have 
of the Framers' intentions are often contradictory, indeterminate, or 
both. Thus, the difficulty of reading the text of the Constitution is merely 
shifted to reading the historical records. Fourth, in those few areas 
where original intent is clear, it is sometimes morally outrageous. Any 
protagonist of original intent must confront the dubious moral accepta-
bility of allowing constitutional interpretation to be governed by the 
beliefs of these men, many of whom believed ardently in slavery and the 
innate inferiority of women. Fifth, the theory of original intent is incon-
sistent with most of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence, with the vast 
majority of scholarly writing, with the opinions of most constitutional 
historians, and probably with the views of most Americans. 
Finally, the adoption of original intent as a universal guiding principle 
would entail an impossible transition from current constitutional 
arrangements. As Mr. Bork once put it, "[t]his Nation has grown up in 
ways that do not comport with the intentions of the people who wrote 
the Constitution-the commerce clause is one exampl~and it is simply 
too late to go back and tear that up. I cite to you the legal tender cases. 
These are extreme examples admittedly. Scholarship suggests that the 
Framers intended to prohibit paper money. Any judge who thought 
today he would go back to the original intent really ought to be accompa-
nied by a guardian rather than be sitting on a bench."64 
VI. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
With this range of defects it is hardly surprising that Mr. Bork chose 
to shift his ground somewhat. In The Tempting of America he argues 
that the understanding of the Constitution's contemporary audience, 
rather than the intent of its original authors, should determine its mean-
ing. This shift has its disadvantages. The best thing about the intent of 
the Framers was that it appealed to the intuition that a document must 
always mean exactly what its authors meant it to. The practitioners of 
original intent can claim that their method is the one "natural" way to 
read the text. They can even claim that we often read other legal docu-
ments this way-that we try to determine what Congress, or the judge, 
63. 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). For the subsequent controversy see also L. LEVY, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CoNSTITUTION (1988); Powell, The Modern Misunderstanding of 
Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987); Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical 
Perspective. 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 296 (1986); Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The 
English. The Americans, And The Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 106 (1990). 
64. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United 
States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. 84-85 (1987) 
[hereinafter Hearings]. 
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or the administrator meant by a particular word or phrase. Original 
understanding has less intuitive appeal. Precisely because it is a more 
sophisticated notion of interpretation, originalism sacrifices the notion 
that there is only one credible way to read a text. The shift also dimin-
ishes the appeal to common experience and the parallel to reading other 
legal texts. 
This problem is a particularly acute one for Mr. Bork. Throughout 
The Tempting Of America he explicitly connects his struggles to those 
going on within other disciplines. Most disciplines seem to have rejected 
the idea that the text can be read to mean only what the author intended. 
Literary critics and historians have acknowledged other accounts of 
reading, which abandon author-centricity to focus on context and the 
text's reception by the reader. These other methods are known generally 
as "the reader's revolution against the author." They represent every-
thing that Mr. Bork finds most reprehensible in today's scholarship. He 
quotes approvingly a letter from intellectual historian Gertrude Himmel-
farb attacking this openness to other methods of interpretation. "Any 
methodology becomes permissible (except of course, the traditional one), 
and any reading of the texts becomes legitimate (except, of course, that of 
the author)" (p. 137). Professor Himmelfarb's objection would be com-
patible with a doctrine of original intent. But Mr. Bork's new version of 
originalism can no longer appeal to the romantic idea that the imperial 
will of the author must govern the text. "The search is not for a subjec-
tive intention" (p. 144). Instead, he lodges interpretive competence in 
the historically-located readers of the constitution. He has merely shifted 
ultimate interpretive authority from the Framers of the Constitution to 
the "public of that time." Mr. Bork has joined the reader's revolution. 
As I pointed out before, this switch is a costly one for Mr. Bork. To 
the initial cost of being seen to adopt the very same methodology 
criticised by conservatives in other academic disciplines, one has to add 
the cost of being seen to change from one dogmatically asserted position 
to another. Mr. Bork obviously feels this one particularly strongly 
because he denies having done it. Though he described himself during 
the hearings as "a judge with an original intent philosophy,,6S and argued 
in print that "original intent is the only legitimate basis for constitutional 
decision-making,"66 he says in The Tempting of America that "[n]o even 
moderately sophisticated originalist" believes the Constitution should be 
governed by "the subjective intent of the Framers" (p. 218). He suggests 
that no-one could ever have held such a belief, because it would necessar-
ily mean that the secretly held beliefs of the Framers could change the 
65. Hearings, Part 1 at 159 (1987). 
66. Bork, supra note 63, at 823. 
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meaning of the document. Thus all moderately sophisticated originalists 
must have believed in original understanding all along. 
This is a red herring. There are many varieties of intentionalism and 
many varieties of "reader-controlled" interpretation. But allowing the 
intention of the author to control interpretation is fairly obviously not 
the same thing as allowing the understanding of the reader to control. 
Expanding the definition of intentionalism does not tum it into the phi-
losophy of original understanding. The "intention of the Framers and 
ratifiers" is not the same as "the understanding of the American people 
at the time." Mr. Bork seems to find it hard to admit the change. 
The most interesting example of Mr. Bork's scholarly method is his 
use in The Tempting of America of sections of his 1986 article The Con-
stitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights. 67 As one might suspect 
from the title, that article defends original intent. But in The Tempting 
of America, Mr. Bork uses those sections to defend original understand-
ing. At first glance, it appears that he does this by finding the words 
"original intent" wherever they appear in the article, and replacing them 
with "original understanding." Passages in the article originally 
reproved Paul Brest for failing to understand that the original intent 
determines the meaning of the fourteenth Amendment. In the book 
these passages are edited and expanded upon, and a new philosophy of 
interpretation is inserted. With a quick change of key words they 
become criticisms of Brest's failure to understand that the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment is determined by original understanding. 68 
Even the same counterarguments can be pressed into service. In 1986 
for example, he writes that "[t]here is one objection to intentionalism 
that is particularly tiresome. Whenever I speak on the subject someone 
invariably asks: "But why should we be ruled by men long dead?"69 In 
1990, Mr. Bork tells us that "[q]uite often, when I speak at a law school 
on the necessity of adhering to the original understanding, a student will 
ask, "But why should we be ruled by men who are long dead?" (p. 170). 
In the era of the word processor, this kind of "search and replace" juris-
prudence has its attractions. Still, both the interpretive criteria and the 
identity of the "dead men" has changed, and Mr. Bork seems uneasy 
with that fact. 70 
The closest Mr. Bork comes to admitting a prior attachment to inten-
tionalism is his confession to having previously "written of the under-
67. Id. 
68. Compare id. at 827-828 with The Tempting of America, at 148-9. 
69. Id. at 827. 
70. Searching for other possible interpretations, I wondered if Mr. Bork thinks original intent 
and original understanding are the same. In that case, why change his terms and say they are 
different? If on the other hand, they are not the same, why not admit he has changed his views and 
explain how he came to believe first that original intent was only permissible judicial philosophy (Id 
at 826, 832) and then that original understanding was the only permissible judicial philosophy? (pp. 
9, 146 passim). 
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standing ofthe ratifiers of the Constitution" (p. 144). Actually, he wrote 
of the intentions of the ratifiers, and a more characteristic statement from 
his earlier self would be "I wish to demonstrate that original intent is the 
only legitimate basis for constitutional decision-making.,,71 This seems 
definite enough, but the new Mr. Bork does not like it. Having de-
emphasised intention, and converted Framers to ratifiers, he then claims 
that he was merely using "a shorthand formulation, because what the 
ratifiers understood themselves to be enacting must be taken to be what 
the public of that time would have understood the words to mean" (p. 
144).72 
VIII. PROBLEMS WITH ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
So Mr. Bork pays a high price for his move from original intent to 
original understanding. Is the game worth the candle? Does he succeed 
in escaping the devastating criticism of original intent which apparently 
prompted originalists to switch their ground in the first place? Sadly for 
him, the answer is no. In fact, a little reflection will reveal that the phi-
losophy of original understanding is beset by exactly the same problems 
as the philosophy of original intent and has less intuitive appeal, to boot. 
Surprisingly, the implications of the choice between original understand-
ing and original intent have received only occasional attention inside the 
originalist movement 73 and little attention outside.74 
71. [d. at 823. 
72. Of course, according to his new theory, what Mr. Bork meant by his "shorthand tenns" is 
irrelevant, the important thing is what he would be understood to mean when he said "original 
intent." Perhaps he feels his new method should not apply here. Yet Mr. Bork is stem in pointing 
out that lawmakers could not use the doctrine of subjective intention to weasel out of something they 
had said. "If Congress enacted a statute outlawing the sale of automatic rifles and did so in the 
Senate by a vote of 51 to 49, no court would overturn a conviction because two Senators in the 
majority testified that they had really intended only to prohibit the use of such rifles. They said 
"sale" and "sale" it is. Thus, the common objection to the philosophy of original understanding-
that Madison kept his notes of the convention at Philadelphia secret for many years-is off the mark. 
He knew that what mattered was public understanding, not subjective intentions" (p. 144). One 
might imagine that the public understanding of "original intent" would be "original intent." 
73. The defense of the philosophy of original understanding, that seems to have convinced Mr. 
Bork is Professor Henry Monaghan's Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 723 (1988). Professor Monaghan implicitly reproves those who put forward "intentionalist" 
versions of originalismfor providing "an easy mark for critics of originalism." [d. at 725. His 
example of an intentionalist who "apparently" holds such as position is R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: 
THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987). [d. at n.8. Professor Monaghan is "forced to conclude that 
original understanding must give way in the face of transfonnative or longstanding precedent, a 
conclusion that in tum may make inevitable the unsettling acknowledgement that originalism and 
stare decisis themselves are but two among several means of maintaining political stability and 
continuity in society." [d. at 724. This conclusion is markedly more consistent with the Burkean 
vision of Mr. Bork's views which I present in Section VIII, than with the attempt to "reason without 
prejudice" towards an abstract and neutral theory of constitutional law. The appearance of 
Professor Monaghan's article in 1988 may explain the sudden, complete, and unacknowledged 
reversal of Mr. Bork's opinions about original intent between 1986 and 1990. 
74. In fact, a number of those commenting on The Tempting of America do not appear to be 
aware that Mr. Bork has changed his position from "intent" to "understanding." See e.g., Eric 
Foner's otherwise excellent review, Bork's notion offramers' 'original intent' smells like bigframeup, 
IN THESE TIMES, Feb. 14-20, 1990, at 18. Despite the title of his article, The Original 
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The first problem facing original intent was that it could not claim to 
be the only authoritative way to read a text. Shifting the focus from 
author's intentions to reader's interpretation lends nothing to the claim 
to the unique correctness of a method of interpretation. 
The second problem facing original intent was the considerable evi-
dence that the Framers themselves intended that their intent should not 
govern future interpretation. Professor H. Jefferson Powell makes this 
point in The Original Understanding of Original Intent,75 an article cited 
by every work on orignal intent, with the notable exception of Mr. 
Bork's. Professor Powell shows that the Framers had a vision of inter-
pretation guided more by the traditional hermeneutic methods of the 
common law than by the simple notion of original intent. If one had to 
pick a single motive that prompted originalists to switch their attentions 
from intent to understanding, it would probably be the difficulty of deal-
ing with this discovery. However, original understanding fares little bet-
ter among the Framers, as this quotation from Alexander Hamilton 
might indicate: 
The Secretary of State will not deny, that whatever may have been 
the intention of the framers of a constitution, or of a law, that inten-
tion is to be sought for in the instrument itself, according to the 
usual & established rules of construction. Nothing is more common 
than for laws to express and effect, more or less than was intended. 
If then a power to erect a corporation, in any case, be deducible by 
fair inference from the whole or any part of the numerous provisions 
of the constitution of the United States, arguments drawn from 
extrinsic circumstances, regarding the intention of the convention, 
must be rejected. 76 
Laws can express or effect more than was intended, or for that matter, 
understood. In such a case, the true guide is the "usual and established 
Misunderstanding, Stephen Presser seems to hold the same opinion. "Judge Bork is a well-known 
'intentionalist,' a scholar who believes that it is appropriate and desirable for modern constitutional 
interpreters to try to understand the aims of those who framed the 1787 document and to implement 
the framer's intent." Presser, The Original Misunderstanding, 84 Nw. U.L. REv. 106 (1990). 
Admittedly, as will be seen later, Mr. Bork's position is not always either clear or consistent. He 
sometimes seems to be assuming that the audience at the time would understand the Constitution to 
mean what they assumed the Framers intended it to mean, thus merging the two positions. Leaving 
aside the circular problems of this argument, it is in fact unlikely that a contemporary legally trained 
reader would have "understood" any such thing. For a definitive and whimsical study of the 
methodological difficulties involved in both versions of originalism, see Bittker, The Bicentennial of 
the Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1989). 
75. 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). For the subsequent controversy see also L. LEVY, ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CONSTITUTION (1988); POWELL, The Modern Misunderstanding of 
Original Intent, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1513 (1987); Berger, "Original Intention" in Historical 
Perspective, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 296 (1986); Presser, The Original Misunderstanding: The 
English, The Americans, And The Dialectic of Federalist Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. L. 
REV. 106 (1990). 
76. Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791) reprinted in 
8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97-111, at 103 (H. Syrett ed. 1965). 
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rules of construction," which at the time certainly did not mean Mr. 
Bork's theory of original understanding. 
The third problem with original intent was its failure as a corrective 
for indeterminacy. Here too the shift represents no improvement. When 
one switches from the indeterminate intentions of a group of authors to 
the indeterminate understandings of an indeterminate group of readers, 
the problem is hardly solved. The historical methods used to work out 
the understanding of the public will differ from those used to work out 
the intention of the framers. Should we follow William Crosskey and 
develop a "dictionary of the eighteenth century word usages, and polit-
ical and legal ideas, which are needed for a true understanding of the 
Constitution"?77 Should we parse the Federalist Papers, the hermeneutic 
conventions of eighteenth century common lawyers, or the propaganda 
pamphlets and broadsheets which the average voter might have consid-
ered? Even if we could agree that understanding rather than intent 
should govern, how do we decide whose understanding is relevant? Is it 
that of the delegates to the conventions? The ratifiers? The people who 
elected the ratifiers? An average member of the legal profession? Of the 
public? Should we include the disenfranchised, or is this to be an entirely 
white male original understanding? Even if we could agree on the correct 
group, the evidence we have of opinions within such groups indicates 
that their "understanding" diverged markedly depending on class, polit-
ical affiliation, professional status, and geographical location.78 
The fourth problem was that in those few cases where we can discern 
the original intent, it often turns out to be morally objectionable. The 
same problem afRicts the theory of original understanding. Franchised 
American society was overwhelmingly a privileged white male group. 
The opinions of a majority of that group strike us today as sexist, racist, 
classist, and heavily elitist. Do we want the understanding of these peo-
ple to govern us? 
The final problem with original intent was that it flew in the face of 
two hundred years of Supreme Court jurisprudence and both scholarly 
and popular opinion. Again, original understanding fares no better. 
Like original intent, original understanding is a philosophically flawed, 
historically unsupported method of interpretation which is often practi-
77. w. CROSSKEY, POLmcs AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1172-73 (1953). 
78. See. e.g .• 1 P. KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (1987). After 
promising a 5 volume" 'original understanding' of those who agitated for, proposed, argued over 
and ultimately voted for or against the Constitution of 1787," id. at xi, the authors had this to say 
about the determinacy of the their findings. "We are loath to dangle before the reader yet another 
promise that the crooked will be made straight and the rough places plain; we promise, rather, 
complexity and complication." In my favorite article on originalism, Boris Bittker quoted the same 
passage and then, speaking through the mouth of a fictional character, described the founder's intent 
as "a well stocked pantry waiting for an imaginative chef." Bittker, supra note 74, at 251. 
290 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities [Vol. 3: 263 
cally indeterminate, sometimes morally objectionable, and generally at 
odds with practice and scholarship. 
How does Mr. Bork deal with these apparently serious problems? In 
particular, how does he deal with the very real historical challenges to 
the validity, workability, and moral acceptability of his method? The 
Tempting of America offers no answer to these historical objections, and 
little in the way of history itself. Mr. Bork quotes a few passages from 
letters or cases, but never engages in the very practice of historical exege-
sis of the constitution which he would require of judges. The only sus-
tained historical work in the book is a history of Mr. Bork's favorite and 
least favorite Supreme Court cases. Since his project is to advocate a 
method based on historical analysis, it may be useful to look closely at 
the one piece of history he offers. 
IX. MR. BORK'S HISTORY 
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or 
feeling ... should induce the court to give to the words of the Con-
stitution a more liberal construction . . . than they were intended to 
bear when the instrument was framed and adopted .... If any of its 
provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the 
instrument itself by which it may be amended: but while it remains 
unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time 
of its adoption. 
This passage is not taken from The Tempting of America, though it 
would certainly not be out of place in that book. Nor is it taken from a 
speech given by a Reagan or Bush appointee to the Justice Department, 
though it bears all the hallmarks of such a document. The quotation 
comes, in fact, from a Supreme Court case. Here is a neat and thor-
oughly authoritative judicial statement of the philosophy of original 
understanding. As such, one might imagine that it finds great favor with 
Mr. Bork. Not so. This is a quotation from Dred Scott v. Sandford,79 
probably the most infamous case ever decided by the Supreme Court and 
the one most universally reviled by generations of law professors. 
This quotation is not an isolated instance. Rather, a large portion of 
Justice Taney's opinion is given over to the original understanding of the 
Constitution on the matter of slavery. Justice Taney not only searches 
for the original understanding of the Constitution, he uses it to interpret 
the Declaration of Independence. Could the slaveowners who wrote and 
ratified that document really have intended that "all men" mean al/ 
men? Justice Taney uses original understanding to decode the meaning 
of these apparently general words. 
79. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393,426 (1857) (emphasis added). 
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The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclu-
sive .... The general words ... would seem to embrace the whole 
human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this 
day would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the 
enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and formed 
no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration; for if 
the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the 
conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of 
Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent 
with the principles they asserted; and instead of the sympathy of 
mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would have 
deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.80 
Some of the Founders of the Republic were slaveowners. So were 
many of the citizens. Since they cannot be presumed to be hypocrites, 
and since their understanding of the document-not the meaning that 
the words have come to acquire--is dispositive, there can be no doubt on 
the matter. Slaves have no share of the rights claimed by the Declaration 
of Independence. 
Given these methodological premises, how can we doubt that Dred 
Scott will lose? Changing sentiment or moral outrage are irrelevant. 
Here is the unedited version of the quotation: 
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or 
feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of 
Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give to the 
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor 
than they were intended to bear when the instrument was framed 
and adopted.81 
Justice Taney, like Mr. Bork, knows that his conception of the judicial 
role is the correct one. Justice Taney, like Mr. Bork, has in his hands a 
timeless document. 
It is not only the same in words, but the same in meaning, and dele-
gates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and secures 
the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it contin-
ues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words, 
but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it 
came from the hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted 
by the people of the United States. Any other rule of construction 
would abrogate the judicial character of this court, and make it the 
mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the day. This court 
was not created by the Constitution for such purposes. Higher and 
graver trusts have been confided to it, and it must not falter from the 
80. [d. at 409-10. 
81. [d. at 426. 
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path of duty. 82 
Does Dred Scott discredit the philosophy of original understanding? 
Obviously, it is disconcerting to find one's philosophy serving as the cor-
nerstone of the most reviled case in the history of the United States 
Supreme Court. It is more than disconcerting to find that original under-
standing seems to write Blacks out of the Constitution and the Declara-
tion of Independence. Still, one might argue that even a good method 
can produce bad results. Is that Mr. Bork's response? Not exactly. 
Mr. Bork does feature Dred Scott in his capsule history of the Court. 
He also agrees that the case is a bad one-"[s]peaking only of the consti-
tutional legitimacy of the decision, and not of its morality, this case 
remained unchallenged as the worst in our history until the twentieth 
century provided rivals for that title" (p. 28). How does Mr. Bork deals 
with this taint on the escutcheon of original understanding? Well, by 
ignoring it, mostly. 
The case takes up 241 pages in the Reports. There is no need to 
examine all of its dubious arguments; it was quite evident not only 
that Scott was to remain a slave but that Justice Taney intended to 
read into the Constitution the legality of slavery forever" (p. 30). 
Having decided that there is "no need to examine" Justice Taney's 
"dubious arguments," many of which were appeals to original under-
standing, Mr. Bork concludes that the real evil in Taney's opinion is that 
it introduces the concept of substantive due process. He describes this 
concept as one "that has been used countless times since by judges who 
want to write their personal beliefs into a document that, most inconve-
niently, does not contain those beliefs" (p. 31). With this breathtakingly 
simple move, Mr. Bork himself is able to ignore the inconvenient parts of 
Taney's opinion, to concentrate solely on Taney's "introduction" of sub-
stantive due process. Mr. Bork considers substantive due process one of 
the most appalling features of contemporary liberal jurisprudence. The 
message is clear. This is "the worst constitutional decision of the nine-
teenth century" (p. 28), and it is the ancestor of contemporary liberal 
constitutional interpretation. Can the fruit fall far from the tree? 
As if this were not enough, Mr. Bork then turns round and concludes 
that the judicial hero of Dred Scott, Justice Benjamin Curtis, author of 
the dissent, was the real proponent of originalism in this case. He 
achieves this by using quotations from the dissent which will not bear the 
meaning he assigns them, while ignoring the explicit defense of original 
understanding in the majority opinion. From Mr. Bork such scholarship 
is more disappointing than it would be from most scholars. Mr. Bork's 
constitutional philosophy relies on the historical record as a check against 
82. [d. 
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judicial activism. Yet, with "history" like this, what could not be 
proved? Let us be charitable and assume that he did not have the oppor-
tunity to read the case before writing about it. How might he deal with 
what Taney's opinion really says? 
Mr. Bork could account for the majority opinion in Dred Scott in one 
of two ways. First, he could say that his method can be convincingly 
manipulated to reach bad results. This response, however, tends to 
undermine his claim that reliance on original understanding constrains 
judicial behavior. Second, he might say that the method was correctly 
used but that it produces repugnant results in this case because the Fram-
ers and ratifiers of the Constitution were racists. This raises the more 
fundamental question of morality. Taney argues with some force that 
the historical record shows that, at the time of the writing of the Consti-
tution, the "unfortunate" Negro race was thought of as almost a different 
species. This view, to say nothing of views about women or the working 
class, are part of both the intention of the Framers and the understanding 
of franchised citizens at the time. Can we accept as an interpretive guide 
to the Constitution the understanding of a group of men whose views 
were sometimes so abhorrent? Mr. Bork might try to answer these objec-
tions by pointing out that there were also abolitionists and radical repub-
licans at the Philadelphia Convention, among the ratifiers of the 
Constitution, and scattered through the general voting population. But 
that observation undermines the notion of a single "original 
understanding. " 
Mr. Bork's actual response seems to be that the morally abhorrent 
views of the Framers have since been purged from the Constitution by 
the fourteenth and nineteenth amendments. This is a particularly weak 
argument, in a book not unduly burdened by strong ones. Imagine for a 
moment that Mr. Bork can identify some coherent group whose under-
standing of the Constitution is clear and consistent and whose views 
ought to bind us. Does he think that the moral views of that group were 
not part of a system but rather a random collection of separate, independ-
ent elements? Can we discard racism and misogyny, keeping the rest 
intact? If you believed women, Blacks and the working class to be infer-
ior and fundamentally untrustworthy, your ideas about the necessary 
structure of society and the division of powers between the organs of 
government would obviously be different from those of someone working 
from more egalitarian and democratic assumptions. It is a strange world 
Mr. Bork lives in, if he thinks a person's deepest moral views have no 
connection to each other, no implications for their other ideas. But then 
again, Mr. Bork does live in a strange world. His unusual combination of 
authoritarian constitutional interpretation and moral skepticism proba-
bly does allow him to believe that moral values have no connection to 
each other. 
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The liberal response to the problem of eighteenth-century bigotry is to 
say that we should not be faithful to the Framers' intentions, or to the 
understanding of those who ratified the Constitution, but instead to a 
generalized and coherent version of the moral system they articulated. 
When the authors of the Declaration of Independence say "all men," 
meaning and being understood to mean only white men, we should 
abstract the universal principle from its rough and irrationally biased his-
torical origins. Purified in the fires of Kantian moral theory it will give 
us the non-racial, sexually equal democracy we (in the insidious knowl-
edge class) have always wanted. This answer will not save Mr. Bork's 
project. In fact, it is what he fears most.83 
Having examined every possible avenue of escape for Mr. Bork, we can 
see why he finds "no need" to trace out Taney's "dubious arguments." 
Those arguments are his own, and they lead him where he does not want 
to go. 
IX. Is BORK A BURKEAN? 
At the beginning of this essay, I argued that it would be a mistake to 
dismiss Mr. Bork's work too easily. It is true that its philosophical and 
historical errors, confused argumentation and sloppy research84 make it a 
particularly easy target for the reviewer's barbs. Nevertheless, to dismiss 
it with a facile (or even a contemptuously patronizing) account of its 
manifold contradictions is to leave a number of important questions 
unanswered. If the arguments in this book are really so weak, why does 
one get the sense while reading it that it taps some deep wellspring of 
discontent with the discourse of liberal politics and academia? Put 
another way, if this book-praised to the heavens by the conservative 
political pundits featured on the book jacket-seems to liberals to be just 
so much dross and bluster, is one side being deceitful, or is there is a 
fundamental breakdown of communication between the two sides? 
I would like to suggest that The Tempting of America is, in fact, a 
schizophrenic work. On one hand, it attempts to justify the theory of 
83. Mr. Bork explicitly rejects such a process. "The role of a judge committed to the philosophy 
of original understanding is not to 'choose a level of abstraction.' Rather it is to find the meaning of 
the text-a process which includes finding its degree of generality which is part of its meaning ... " 
(p. 149). That meaning, of course, can only come from text and original understanding, not from 
Kantian moral theory. Mr. Bork has been strongly criticized by liberal legal theorists, particularly 
by Ronald Dworkin, for his failure to "purify" the original understanding by raising it to a higher 
level of generality. Ironically, the method Dworkin espouses is exactly the method Mr. Bork himself 
advocated in his writings in the late sixties and early seventies, though Kant seems to have whispered 
different results into their respective ears. 
84. Sloppy research seems the most charitable explanation for Mr. Bork's treatment of Dred 
Scott. Other parts of the book show that the pressure of timely publication may have worked its 
subtle magic on Mr. Bork's table of authorities. Admittedly, the relatively indiscriminate citation 
which results has its own charming compensations. Senator Edward Kennedy and Professor 
Duncan Kennedy will no doubt both be dismayed to find that the index has amalgamated them into 
a single person with an impressive, if varied, list of publications (p. 412). 
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original understanding within the epistemological framework of liberal 
rationalism, while on the other it presents a basic challenge to that entire 
framework. To be sure, the challenge is not a systematic one. To be 
sure, it wa.o; made (and made better) over two hundred years ago by 
Edmund Burke. To be sure, Mr. Bork does not himself distinguish the 
occasions on which he is working within the canon of liberal thought 
from the occasions when he is challenging it. But there is a challenge 
here, nonetheless: a challenge to such foundations of liberal rationalism 
as the idea that no one has a privileged insight into the moral universe, or 
that the only social institutions worth keeping are those which pass test 
of reason. In fact, there is a challenge to the possibility of compre-
hending the social world at all through the reliance on only "the fallible 
and feeble contrivances of our reason. ,,8S 
Seen in this light, this book may mark a departure for Mr. Bork. For 
the ·first time, he seems to question the centrality of the problem of value, 
the problem which has animated all of his previous conservative incarna-
tions. Each of the theories he has espoused promised to solve, or at least 
salve, the problem that, in a liberal society, values are presumed to be 
subjective and arbitrary and the state is supposed to embody no particu-
lar conception of the good. Some of the theories offered a neutral 
method (economic analysis, neutral principles), while others claimed to 
have identified the right parties whose values should govern (libertarian-
ism, process theory, and original intent). All assume that the SUbjectivity 
of values is the problem to be solved and that reason is the tool to solve 
it. It is my claim that, at certain places in his most recent work, Mr. 
Bork moves away from both of those assumptions. To explain how he 
does so, I must first set the stage. 
So far in this article I have concentrated on those places where Mr. 
Bork has tried and failed to fit his ideas into the analytical framework 
provided by liberal rationalism. In this section I will focus on the other 
strand of his ideas. In order to do so, I will compare Mr. Bork's ideas to 
those of those of the great 18th century conservative, Edmund Burke. 
Burke wrote at the dawn of "the age of reason," while Bork writes in 
what is supposed to be its twilight. The surprising similarities in their 
ideas may explain the attractiveness of Mr. Bork's work despite its ana-
lytical flaws. At the same time, it may illuminate the condition of late 
twentieth century conservative thought. To bring out this other side of 
Mr. Bork's work, it is necessary to return to those parts of his argument 
which seem most dogmatic and contradictory-in particular, his attempt 
to have his philosophy of interpretation imposed as a prerequisite to judi-
cial confirmation, and his account of the legitimacy of "moral 
legislation. " 
85. E. BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 121 (C.C. O'Brien ed. 1968). 
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Mr. Bork believes that to require judicial candidates to adhere to one 
interpretive method would be a contentious, political, and therefore a 
bad decision. We could not insist, for example, that candidates for the 
Supreme Court promise to consider only the face value of the words of 
the Constitution. Nor could we insist that judges swear that they would 
interpret the Constitution's provisions in the light of changing moral sen-
timent, economic efficiency, technological progress, or democratic val-
ues. To impose any of these interpretive methods would be "political." 
But he does not consider it "political" to insist, as a precondition for 
their confirmation, that judges swear loyalty to the method of original 
intent. It is not political, it seems, because that method is right. 
This confident willingness to dictate a method to those with different 
views is hard to reconcile with relativism and the idea that values are 
subjective. After all, one premise of the liberal state is that no one has a 
privileged insight into the moral or philosophical universe.86 No one can 
use a claim to moral truth to get the state to enforce his views on 
others. 87 
Mr. Bork's attempt to justify his dogmatism within the strictures of 
liberal rationalism results in the knotty difficulties described in the first 
part of this essay. He claims that his current method of interpretation is 
not one among competing methods, but is instead the only way to read a 
legal text properly. He claims that it is neutral in derivation and applica-
tion, and not a set of value judgements. If value judgements are being 
imposed, they are those of the Framers and ratifiers. He claims that his 
method is well-founded historically, and that we would have to invent it 
if it were not. He claims so many things, and so unconvincingly, that one 
is driven to wonder if he cares about this side of his argument. These 
difficulties would all disappear if Mr. Bork decided explicitly to reject the 
premises of liberalism. It would be stretching the point to say that Mr. 
Bork does in fact make a frontal attack on these premises. But for every 
time that he accepts them, there is another moment when he challenges 
them. His discussion of morals provides a particularly good example. 
At first, Mr. Bork comes across as entirely conventional in his prem-
ises, if not his conclusions, about moral argument. Like the sexually 
86. Hence liberals argue that decisions about value should be solved by the aggregation of 
individual subjective choices. The democracy adds up our individual subjective values as expressed 
by votes, and the market adds up our individual subjective values as expressed by the dollars we 
spend. Mr. Bork appeals powerfully to this tradition when he claims that the effect of knowledge 
class's attack on original intent has been to take value judgements away from the legislatures. After 
all, questions on which reasonable people can disagree should properly be decided by democratically 
elected representatives, because judges do not have a superior insight into the moral or philosophical 
universe. U nelected judges should not impose their subjective views on others. Yet, to get to this 
point, he must argue that originalism is both correct and a-political. Surely this implies that some 
(unelected) people, Mr. Bork among them, do have a superior insight into the philosophical 
universe-and are not at all chary about imposing their correct insight on others. 
87. This, of course, is exactly Mr. Bork's criticism of the liberal jurisprudes and judges. 
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active, egalitarian members of the knowledge class, Mr. Bork often 
sounds like a social rationalist and a moral relativist. Scattered through-
out The Tempting of America are discussions apparently based on the 
idea that moral values (but not interpretive methods) are subjective, rela-
tive, and not subject to rational discussion. It is for exactly this reason 
that he believes that some of the issues beloved of liberal constitutional-
ists should be decided by legislatures rather than courts. Courts have no 
business deciding questions of value, where one person's opinion is as 
good as another's. In these cases the majority decision is the only valid 
one. 
This opinion recurs frequently, as, for example, in his discussion of the 
death penalty. He says of that debate, for example, "[i]t does no good to 
dress the issue up as one of moral philosophy, because such philosophy 
does not give a clear answer. Arguments have been made both ways and 
none is conclusive" (p. 214). Mr. Bork does not think much of contem-
porary academic forays into moral philosophy. He points out that "[i]f 
the greatest minds in our culture have not succeeded in devising a moral 
system to which all intellectually honest persons must subscribe, it seems 
doubtful, to say the least, that some law professor will make the break-
through any time soon" (p. 255). Who can disagree? He announces that 
he has made a decision, already evidenced by his presentation of oppos-
ing arguments, to give up reading legal scholarship of this type. "There 
comes a time to stop visiting inventor's garages to see if someone really 
has created a perpetual motion machine" (p. 255). Who can fail to sym-
pathize? Mr. Bork even agrees with Alisdair MacIntyre that "[t]here 
seems to be no rational way of securing moral agreement in our cul-
ture. "88 Again, these seem like the words of a moral relativist. 
In his argument for "legislated morality," however, Bork's views 
become more complicated. He still seems to believe that moral decisions 
are not subject to proof or refutation and therefore are unreviewable by 
the analytic techniques of judicial reason. Thus they must be left to the 
democratic legislature and the majority view. Although this certainly 
seems like moral relativism, Mr. Bork reserves the term "relativist" for 
those who disagree with him about the propriety of "legislated morality." 
Liberals assume that if morals are SUbjective and relative, the state 
should not be allowed to legislate morality for its citizens. Mr. Bork 
draws rather different conclusions. 
There being nothing in the Constitution prohibiting legislated 
morality, the only opposition to it rests upon a moral view. The 
Bowers dissent said as much when it stated as a "moral fact" that a 
person belongs to himself and not to others or to society. Moral 
relativism is, after all, one moral position. But the imposition of 
88. A. MACINTYRE. AfTER VIRTUE 6 (2d ed. 1984). quoted in Bork at 256. 
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moral relativism upon legislatures by judges is not, strictly speaking, 
moral relativism in itself. It is more accurately described as the 
belief that the only valid and trustworthy morality is the judges'. (p. 
126) 
The key to this argument is the way it deprives moral relativism of uni-
versal status. By characterizing relativism as just one particular moral 
system, rather than as universal claim about all moral systems, Mr. Bork 
is able to tum the tables rather neatly. To say that we cannot legislate 
morality would be to impose a moral view-moral relativism-some-
thing which moral relativism itself should prohibit. Legislated morality 
cannot be reviewed, precisely because it is morality. The judge's opinion 
is of no more weight than anyone else's. Very well, then. How do we 
know when something is a moral issue? The answer to that question 
turns out to be a little more complicated. 
Discussing the application of the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of' 
equal protection to laws which make distinctions on the basis of gender 
or sexual orientation, Mr. Bork makes two interesting pronouncements. 
The first is about gender. "The general language of the clause, however, 
continues to subject such cases to the test of whether statutory distinc-
tions are reasonable. Sexual differences obviously make some distinc-
tions reasonable while others have no apparent basis" (p. 150). Now, it 
might appear unreasonable to ban homosexuals from military service 
without proof that letting them serve would have negative effects. It 
might appear unreasonable to criminalize a particular sexual practice 
between consenting adults in their own home simply because some peo-
ple don't like the idea of it. Mr. Bork does not find it so. "Society'S 
treatment of sexual orientation is based upon moral perceptions, so that it 
would be difficult to say that the various moral balances struck are 
unreasonable" (p. 150, emphasis added). 
The boundaries shift in this argument. Disparate treatment of women 
can only be allowed if the distinction is reasonably based on (presumably 
physical) sexual differences. Mere opinion or prejUdice is not enough. 
Disparate treatment of gays, however, is "based on moral perceptions" 
and therefore "it would be difficult to say" that they were "unreasona-
ble." He restates this theme in more uncompromising tones in his dis-
cussion of Bowers v. Hardwick. 89 "[T]he suit was surely brought to seek 
a declaration that would equate the constitutionality, and hence the pre-
sumed morality, of homosexual and heterosexual conduct. Hardwick's 
suit, in a word, rested upon nothing in the Constitution and so was one 
more sortie in our cultural war" (p. 117). 
How does Mr. Bork know that discrimination against gays is a matter 
of unreviewable and a-rational morality, while any discrimination against 
89. 478 u.s. 186. 
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women must undergo judicial scrutiny for reasonableness? Those who 
believe that a woman's place is in the home argue that any other state of 
affairs is unnatural and immoral. How does Mr. Bork determine what 
constitutes a legitimately moral issue as opposed to merely an irrational 
prejudice? The answer, I think, is that an issue is a "moral" one if it has 
been traditionally seen as one by the majority of people in the society. I 
can see no other distinction which will allow Mr. Bork to call discrimina-
tion against gays, but not against women, a matter of "morality."90 
Mr. Bork's constitutional philosophy is not as changeless and neutral 
as he pretends. He rails against liberals for modifying the constitution 
according to changing moral sentiments, yet his interpretive method will 
produce different results when sentiments change about which issues 
count as moral ones. Mr. Bork appears as blind to this contradiction as 
he was to the one between his complaint about the political litmus test 
applied in his confirmation hearings and his own advocacy of such a test. 
These contradictions lead us back to the possible challenge to Enlight-
enment premises hinted at in Bork's theory. I started this section point-
ing out that Mr. Bork often strays far from the two core premises of post-
Enlightenment liberal thought about social institutions. The first prem-
ise is that social institutions should be held up to the test of reason, and 
those that cannot be rationally justified should perish. The second is that 
morals are subjective and relative and not subject to rational proof.91 
From the second premise, or sometimes from the conjunction of both 
premises, we derive this corollary: since no one has a privileged insight 
into the moral universe, the state should be neutral among conceptions of 
the good. In his discussion of sex discrimination, homosexuality, moral 
legislation, and judicial method, Mr. Bork oscillates between criticizing 
and relying on these liberal premises. He talks like a relativist one 
moment, and then like one possessed of The Truth. He criticizes liberals 
for imposing their ideas of judicial method and then argues that his own 
should be imposed. He takes the liberal premise about relative values 
and draws from it the conclusion that the judges cannot force the state to 
·be neutral among conceptions of the good, because that would be the 
90. And even there, I suspect he might be wrong given the traditional "moral" justifications of 
sexism. 
91. The contradiction between these two premises frames the most common source of critiques 
of liberalism. For two very different such critiques see R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 
(1975) ("The characteristic predicament of the modem lawyer is to argue constantly about policy, as 
if rational choice among competing values were possible, yet to remain faithful to the idea that 
values are subjective and to the political doctrine of which that idea is apart.") and Arrow's 
Impossibility Theorem (There are four minimum, but mutually exclusive, conditions which would 
have to be satisfied for social choice accurately to reflect popular preferences. Social choices would 
have to be transitive, free, and based on "endogenous" preferences. It must also be free from an 
inverse relationship between the popularity of a choice and society's tolerance of it. According to 
Arrow, all four conditions cannot be satisfied at once.) For problems in the conceptualization of 
"choice" in models relying on an Arrovian vision see Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 WIS. L. REv. 
769; A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY (1987). 
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imposition of a particular conception of the good. He tells judges that 
they should wear their critical rationalist hats in reviewing laws which 
burden women, but their deferential relativist hats when they are review-
ing laws burdening homosexuals. 
Mr. Bork is at his strongest in his fragmentary critiques92 of rational-
ism and relativism, so it is these that I propose to develop. I do so partly 
because I am aware of the place of such a critique in the heritage of 
conservative thought. There is a noble tradition of conservative attacks 
on rationalism, relativism, and the other bulwarks of liberalism. 
Edmund Burke mounted exactly such an attack. Burke's scattered topi-
cal writings resist summary, but his fundamental criticism was of the 
hubris involved in supposedly rational criticisms of social institutions. 
Scornful of the dogma that all values are relative, Burke argued that all 
worthwhile values come from the often unreflective acceptance of a soci-
ety's traditions. The most telling theme of Burke's writings is his defense 
of this unreflective acceptance, which he defiantly called "prejudice," 
against the illusion of reason. 
Burke argued against the rational reform of social institutions by 
pointing out that the human ability to foresee was finite, whereas the 
tests to which existing social institutions were subjected were infinite. 
We should not abandon an institution simply because it is susceptible to 
rational criticism. Despite a lack of ostensible justification, an institution 
might now be fulfilling social functions of which we are ignorant. Puffed 
up with pride in the power of reason, we might fiddle with something 
vital to the structure of our society. Instead, we should put our trust in 
tradition and "nature." Or, as Burke would put it, "by calling in the aid 
of [nature's] unerring and powerful instincts, to fortify the fallible and 
feeble contrivances of our reason, we have derived several other, and 
those no small benefits from considering our liberties in the light of an 
inheritance."93 Thus, traditions which seem contradictory, chaotic, and 
irrational should be embraced and defended against the facile wisdom of 
those who "[b]y what they call reasoning without prejudice ... leave not 
one stone upon another in the fabric of human society. They subvert all 
the authority which they hold as well as all that which they have 
destroyed. " 
This is fine strong stuff. Contemptuous of liberal paeans on the power 
of reason, Burke puts his faith in tradition, prejudice, and solid quiet 
opinion. Such a theory could support the imposition of oaths to follow 
92. I say fragmentary because it would be unfair to caJ1 Mr. Bork a systematic thinker. He 
seems uncomfortable with abstractions. This is not necessarily a criticism. In fact, it is the strength 
of many of his most interesting arguments. For example, he prefers to argue for moral relativism on 
the basis of the number of people who have tried and failed to build an objective moral theory, than 
to argue that the fact/norm dichotomy makes it conceptually impossible. In this, he is very like 
Burke. 
93. BURKE, supra note 85. 
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one kind of judicial interpretation-provided only that it be proved to be 
traditional. Indeed, such a theory could support the imposition of more 
overt conservative oaths to defend the status quo, should that be neces-
sary. Is Mr. Bork a Burkean? Should he be one? 
At first sight, the answer to both questions is "no." After all, Mr. 
Bork claims that his constitutional philosophy is objectively correct, that 
it is neutral in derivation and application, and that it does not represent 
the imposition of a particular set of values onto the Constitutional docu-
ment. This sounds like the sort of attempt to "reason without prejudice" 
about social institutions of which Burke was so contemptuous. Yet, as 
we have seen, Mr. Bork's arguments for the objective correctness of the 
theory of original understanding are philosophically bankrupt, histori-
cally unfounded, and practically indeterminate. His account would be 
more persuasive if he were to abandon the claims to objective 
correctness. 
Probably the greatest structural similarity between the ideas of Burke 
and Mr. Bork, is their resort to a kind of class analysis. Each sees him-
self as the defender of a strong but inarticulate tradition against the dep-
redations of an intellectual class drunk on its own wordy theories.94 
Burke's opponent was the reformism, iconoclasm, egalitarianism, and 
dangerous rationalism of the parvenu bourgeoisie. He set himself up 
against "the delusive plausibilities of moral politicians,"9s saving his 
sharpest barbs for what he saw as their mindless love of change for 
change's sake. "A spirit of innovation is generally the result of a selfish 
temper and confined views. People will not look forward to posterity, 
who never looked back to their ancestors. ,,96 Burke argued for the spon-
taneous, organic and above all traditional process of government, a pro-
cess which was valuable regardless of whether it was explicable in terms 
of the new categories of the rationalists. "All your sophisters cannot pro-
duce any thing better adapted to preserve a rational and manly freedom 
than the course we have pursued, who have chosen our nature rather 
than our speculations, our breasts rather than our inventions, for the 
great conservatories and magazines of our rights and privileges. "97 
Mr. Bork's villains are the intellectual or knowledge class, but the 
opinions that class possesses are exactly the proud, questioning and 
94. "Intellectual presumption-<>r self-confidence---is the morale of the revolutionary, whereby 
he is enabled to call established order into question, in society, in the State, in the Church, in the 
family. This is the way in which ability makes its inroads into property. In using his magnificent 
intelligence to deprecate the claims of intelligence, Burke as usual, is discharging a double function. 
He serves the interests of the property owners, thus earning their gratitude. And at the same time he 
rehabilitates religion, and notably-though discreetly and by indirection-that form of religion 
which had most been exposed to the remorseless onslaughts of Reason." C.c. O'Brien, Introduction, 
id. at 47. 
95. Burke, supra note 85, at 125. 
96. Id. at 1l9. 
97. Id. at 121. 
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rationalist ones that Burke criticized. This is not surprising when one 
realizes that it was Burke's parvenu eighteenth century bourgeoisie who 
developed the ideology that Bork's knowledge class now expounds. Not 
only are the ideas of the knowledge class marked by the hubris of 
rational social reform, they are constantly in flux. Sounding a common 
note with Justice Taney, Mr. Bork decries the idea that changing senti-
ments could have any effect on constitutional law. "The assumptions 
and ideas of the intellectual class regularly mutate, which means, to the 
extent that constitutional law incorporates these assumptions, our funda-
mental law will shift with fashion" (p. 242). Burke made the same point 
about the social reformers of his day, using the same comparison with 
fashion. 
Not only the traditions of governance, but moral traditions also need 
to be defended against the knowledge class's rationalistic tinkering. Like 
Burke, Mr. Bork is at his most emphatic when he extols these values. He 
argues specifically against the liberal vision of the morally neutral state. 
For him society must be able to legislate its moral values if it is not to 
"dissolve social bonds" (p. 249). He quotes approvingly Lord Devlin's 
dictum: "[w]hat makes a society is a community of ideas, not political 
ideas alone but also ideas about the way its members should govern their 
lives" (p. 249). Burke would have applauded. The liberal tradition sees 
civil society as an empty vessel to be filled with, rather than to shape or 
determine, the values and preferences of its citizens. It is precisely this 
relativist attitude which gives the state its universal status above any of 
the particular groups, parties, or religions which it contains. Burke con-
sidered this idea of a neutral universal state a delusion. There could be 
no state, no justice, even no understanding, outside of a particular tradi-
tion of governance, law, religion, culture and language. The crux of tra-
ditions is that they are not "rationaL'" We should protect the social 
fabric of our society, from its great institutions of government to its 
smallest traditions of personal morals and etiquette, from the rationalist 
assault. 
In liberal thought, society is a container full of independent actors 
with different desires and values. Values and desires may change, just as 
different drinks can be put into the same glass, but the society remains. 
On the other hand, writing in the tradition of classical republicanism, 
Burke and Mr. Bork see each society as an expression of a particular set 
of traditional values and assumptions. To destroy those assumptions is 
to destroy the society. In fact, the possibility of change in social attitudes 
represents such a threat to Mr. Bork that he might support the use of 
state force to prevent it. "A change in moral environment-in social 
attitudes towards sex, marriage, duties towards children and the like-
may surely be felt to be as harmful as the possibility of physical violence 
or the absence of proportional representation of ethnic groups in the 
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workforce" (p. 247). If we can use the power of the state to prevent the 
latter two evils, why not the former? Of course, this represents a 
profound contrast with Mr. Bork's earlier views. The current Mr. Bork 
has abandoned the libertarian concerns which led him to criticize moral 
legislation. He seems to have deserted the liberal world where values 
may not be legislated. for the Burkean world where they must be. 
Both Burke and Mr. Bork are most effective when they point out the 
contradictions in liberal thought. Mr. Bork points out that liberals want 
it both ways-to impose their ends-neutral vision of the state, and then to 
claim that this vision is not a political or moral vision at all. Score one 
for Mr. Bork. He asks how liberals can trumpet their relativistic vision 
while at the same time imposing on the country their moral views on 
such issues as busing, school prayer, and the "prohibition of father-son 
banquets at high-schools." "On the one hand, there appears to be a 
degree of morality so severe it amounts to moralism, and, on the other, a 
hostility to morality so strong it amounts to moral relativism" (p. 245). 
Writing at the beginning of the rise of liberalism and the dawn of the 
political Enlightenment, Burke had a similar disdain for the way that the 
liberal exaltation of "toleration" played itself out in state policy. "We 
hear these new teachers continually boasting of their. spirit of toleration. 
That those persons should tolerate all opinions, who think none to be of 
estimation, is a matter of small merit. Equal neglect is not impartial 
kindness."98 He was particularly incensed at the suggestion of Reverend 
Price that those who did not find the Church of England congenial 
should set up their own religion. 
It is somewhat remarkable that the reverend divine should be so 
earnest for setting up new churches, and so perfectly indifferent con-
cerning the doctrine which may be taught in them. His zeal is of a 
curious kind. It is not for the diffusion of truth, but for the spread-
ing of contradiction. Let the noble teachers but dissent, it is no mat-
ter from whom or from what. This great point once secured it is 
taken for granted that their religion will be rational and manly.99 
It might be Mr. Bork speaking, taxing liberals for exalting the values of 
homosexuals, criminals, and drug users in the name of tolerance and 
moral relativism, while they denigrate the values of the moral majority. 
The cause of this double standard is the knowledge class's pernicious 
egalitarian ethos (p. 245). Both Burke and Bork think that egalitarian-
ism is a corrosive doctrine, weakening the social distinctions and mental 
habits on which social stability is founded. Burke called it "that mon-
strous fiction, which by inspiring false ideas and vain expectations into 
men destined to travel in the obscure walk of laborious life, serves only to 
98. [d. at 258-59. 
99. [d. at 95. 
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aggravate and embitter that real inequality which it never can remove; 
and which the order of civil life establishes as much for the benefit of 
those whom it must leave in an humble state, as those whom it is able to 
exalt to a condition more splendid, but not more happy."loo Mr. Bork is 
as dismissive, if less florid. "Egalitarianism is hostile to hierarchies and 
distinctions. Hence law must be used to weaken or eliminate them, strik-
ing at private morality and behavior that is not egalitarian. For entirely 
innocent reasons, the preferences and talents of people will not always 
produce equality of results. The egalitarian tendency is then to coerce 
equality of result by law" (p. 245-6). The best protector of these 
"entirely innocent inequalities" is the unquestioning reverence of tradi-
tional values which both Burke and Mr. Bork extol. 
A desire to defend society from the "delusive plausibilities of moral 
politicians," a condemnation of the hubris of rational reformism, a hostil-
ity to the epistemology of moral relativism and the liberal vision of a 
morally neutral state, an exaltation of tradition against the demands of 
egalitarian social thought-all of these unite Burke and Mr. Bork. In 
fact, all that divides them is Mr. Bork's lingering but tenuous attachment 
to the language of rationalism, the language favored by many of his foes 
in the knowledge class. 
The language of liberal rationalism conjures up a world where social 
realities are objectively knowable facts, while values are relative, subjec-
tive and partial. If one accepts these premises, then the epistemological 
task is to jump this gap, to reach objective knowledge of the Good, or in 
this case, of the Constitution. Various methods are suggested. But 
whether the method entails a veil of ignorance or an ideal speech situa-
tion, wide reflective equilibrium or participation-reinforcing process the-
ory, it has a single goal: to achieve a kind of knowledge free from 
prejUdice and partiality, which does not equate "that which is" and "that 
which should be," and which does not have a particular set of values 
built into its methodological premises. These goals are the very ones that 
part of Bork holds dear. He spends half of his time arguing that his 
method gives us access to facts and not values, that it is neutral in deriva-
tion and application, and free from prejudice and partiality. He spends 
the other half of his time arguing, in the good Burkean manner, in favor 
of prejudice and partiality, in favor of the authority of tradition, and in 
favor of a state which is not neutral as to moral values, but instead writes 
one particular set of values into law. Mr. Bork seems to imagine that 
the contradiction is simply between that which the Constitution pros-
cribes and that which the majority is entitled to do. But it is more than 
that. It is a fundamental clash of ideologies, of epistemologies, of polit-
ical visions. It is the reappearance of this clash within his theory of 
100. Id. at 124. 
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originalism that marks the failure of his project. After all, if the con-
servative republican vision of the state is correct, what is wrong with a polit-
ically "prejudiced" theory of interpretation and constitutional values? A 
modem-day Burke would say that, since all understanding must start 
from the values of a particular tradition and a particular social order, 
there can be no other kind. 101 On the other hand, if the conservative 
vision is wrong, there is no foundation for Bork's reliance on tradition, 
his attack on the moral relativism of the knowledge class, or his pane-
gyric upon a state which "must legislate moral values if it is not to dis-
solve social bonds." He simply cannot have it both ways. He should 
give up his lip service to the liberal conventions of argument. 
My point here is that Mr. Bork has tried to hold together a fundamen-
tally schizophrenic argument. He has struggled to fit the ideas of tradi-
tional conservatism within the framework of liberalism. The lacunae and 
contradictions in his book thus represent not simply mistakes, but rather 
signs of a deep epistemological tension. What would happen if he simply 
jettisoned the liberal rationalist side of his ideas? He would have to aban-
don his claim that his theory of interpretation is neutral in derivation and 
application. He would have to embrace as the final legitimator of his 
theory not the "fallible and feeble contrivances of reason," but instead 
"prejudice" and tradition. Such an admission would encourage readers 
to focus their attention on the profound challenge which this kind of 
conservatism represents for the epistemology of liberal rationalism. 
What kind of constitutional philosophy would this produce? It would 
start from premises rather different from those of liberalism. The 
assumption would be that legitimacy could adhere only to the content of 
particular social orders, rather than to some general plan of ordered lib-
erty. Thus, in constitutional decision-making and scholarship, there 
would be less resort to the abstract reasoning that so infuriates Burke and 
Mr. Bork, and more reliance on the values and traditions of this particu-
lar society. Liberal analysis purports to start from a place outside any 
particular clash of values. Will the Nazis get to march through Skokie, 
or can the residents prevent them? Can 2 Live Crew play uncensored in 
Florida, or can the local authorities stop them? To resolve these clashes, 
liberalism interprets the Constitution as a set of universal norms which 
stand on a higher level than any particular clash. It can thus can be 
101. Mr. Bork has two contradictory responses to this point: one from his liberal side, the other 
from his Burkean side. His first response is to deny that the adoption of his theory is a political 
choice or that his theory embodies a particular set of values. In an echo of his bygone Wechslerian 
days, he argues that his theory is neutral in derivation and application. His second response is that 
the adoption of original understanding is a political choice, but that it was a choice "made long ago 
by those who designed and enacted the Constitution" (p. 177). It does embody a particular set of 
values, but they are the values ofthe Framers (and enactors). The former argument sufferS from the 
philosophical flaws pointed out in section VI. The latter, notwithstanding its perfect circularity, is 
undermined by the problems of history discussed in the text accompanying notes 60-66. Finally, of 
course, both arguments cannot be true at the same time. 
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enforced without violating the injunction that the state should embody 
no particular set of political beliefs. lo2 Liberalism casts itself as the 
umpire in a clash of ideologies, not as one of the players, not as an ideol-
ogy itself. 
To Mr. Bork, however, it is clear that the norms enforced do in fact 
reflect a particular set of political beliefs-those of Professor Tribe and 
the knowledge class-and no argument that these norms are immanent 
in the constitutional order will convince him. A Burkean constitutional 
theory would claim that there are no universal norms of process which 
allow us to solve a dispute without, ourselves, entering into the fray. 
Instead, we must accept that the state itself embodies a particular set of 
value judgements and that realization of these values is a good thing. 
Rather than hanging above the clash of ideologies, the state actively pro-
motes a particular path of virtue. This would be a constitutionalism 
based on societal traditions, skeptical of claims to universal truth. 
This Burkean theory of constitutional law would in some ways resem-
ble recent "republican constitutional theory.,,103 From its inception, the 
liberal refrain in American politics and constitutionalism has had a con-
trapuntal theme of repUblicanism. So far, the majority of republican con-
stitutional scholarship has taken the repUblican injunction to civic virtue 
to refer to the "active" virtues of political action and civic participation 
in the life of the repUblic. A Burkean repUblicanism would be more con-
cerned with the passive virtues, such as acceptance of one's place in the 
hierarchy and conformity to the traditional moral norms of society. 
Nevertheless, it would share with its radical repUblican counterpart a 
belief that the state cannot be a mere empty vessel, containing the values 
of its citizens but not partaking of them. 
For the liberal, the state is just a means to an end, a device to maxi-
mize individual freedom. For the Burkean, the state is an end in itself. 
This difference has radical implications for the question of state interfer-
ence with individual interests. Both "freedom" and "state" take on a 
particular meaning, in the Burkean's case a traditional one. 
[W]hile the conservative may require a loose connection between the 
state and civil society (looser, say, than that which exists in China), 
he will wish to see the state as end and not as means, just as he sees 
civil society. The state as means (as administrative machine, or 
business enterprise or welfare officer, or whatever) -such a state is 
102. The best chroniclers of this aspect of the aspirations of the liberal state are, ironically 
enough, Marx and Hegel. 
103. See generally Roads Not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking in Modem 
Constitutional Theory, 85 Nw. V.L. REv. I (1990); Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in 
American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57 (1987); I. POCOCK, THE 
MACHlA VELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC 
REPUBLICAN TRADmoN (1975); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.I. 1539 
(1988). 
1991] Boyle 307 
not one to which the citizen can belong. Nor are the ends to which 
the state is supposed to be subordinate really capable of description 
outside the order which embodies them. This is certainly true of the 
liberal end of freedom. Naturally, one's neighbors may interfere 
with one, to a greater or lesser extent, but until we are given some 
concrete description of the social and political arrangement, it is 
impossible to say whether this interference is desirable. The 'inter-
ference' proper to a rural community in Zululand is greater than 
anything experienced in a Soviet city. Yet it would be sadly mis-
guided to call it a loss of freedom, when subjection to this kind of 
interference is precisely what it is to be a Zulu. And as soon as there 
is interference, there is a form of rule, and therefore a state, however 
loosely constituted. Without some move in this direction, towards 
constituted power, a person is neither free nor unfree, but lives like 
the nomads of the anarchistic commune, in a perpetual hallucina-
tion of freedom that can be translated only into solipsistic acts. 104 
Seen in this light, Mr. Bork's views on privacy take on a new coherence. 
He has gone from describing Griswold as "a salutary demonstration of 
the Court's ability to protect fundamental human values"IOS to describ-
ing it as an "unprincipled" and "utterly specious" decision, a "constitu-
tional time-bomb." Mr. Bork's new belief that society must legislate 
moral values if it is not to dissolve social bonds (p. 249) is clearly related 
to this about-face over privacy. The Burkean Mr. Bork believes there are 
compelling reasons for government interference in decisions the liberal 
would regard as "personal." For the liberal, the fact that these decisions 
are not only intimate but also caught up in (relative) moral judgements is 
the reason the state should stay out of them. For the Burkean, on the 
other hand, these "moral" views are actually the basis of state and soci-
ety. Given this perspective, it is hardly surprising that Mr. Bork feels 
that "[a] change in moral environment-in social attitudes towards sex, 
marriage, duties towards children and the like-may surely be felt to be 
as harmful as the possibility of physical violence or the absence of pro-
portional representation of ethnic groups in the workforce" (p. 247). The 
issues which had seemed the farthest from the reach of permissible state 
interference are revealed to be constitutive of state and society. The pic-
ture has reversed itself. Roger Scruton, an English conservative, puts it 
particularly well: 
[The] individual has become a sophisticated being, anxious for a 
sphere of privacy in which to seclude the eccentricities that fulfil 
him. His fulfillment, he thinks, is impossible without the "right of 
privacy" which Englishmen regard as indefeasible. But what does 
this right amount to when unprotected by the state? Nothing. 
104. R. ScRUTON, THE MEANING OF CONSERVATISM 47 (1984). 
105. Bork, supra note 35, at 8. 
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What is fulfillment without the values of a social order? Nothing. 
And whas it eccentricity without the norm against which to measure 
it? Nothing. This Anglo-Saxon privacy which we esteem is in fact 
nothing more than the public order seen from within. It is not the 
vacuous freedom of liberalism, but a substantial and enduring thing, 
whose content becomes clear only with its limits. 106 
Where do those limits come from? In the Burkean world they are 
derived from the history, customs, and traditional morality of the partic-
ular society. No wonder Mr. Bork has backed away from awarding first 
amendment protection to all human behavior, and prohibiting the major-
ity's interference with what it cannot see. To the Burkean, this would 
give any minority carte blanche to undermine the web of meaning and 
morality on which the society rests. No wonder Mr. Bork now sees the 
plaintiff's argument in Bowers v. Hardwick, an argument indistinguish-
able from the one he himself made in 1968, to be "one more sortie in our 
cultural war." 
There is another puzzle in Mr. Bork's intellectual history which can be 
solved by assuming that he is moving towards a Burkean constitutional 
theory. Why do texts become so much clearer, history so much less 
ambiguous, as Mr. Bork grows older? When I first read Mr. Bork's work 
in chronological order, I had the distinct impression that I was moving 
backwards rather than forwards in time. Most people begin by seeing 
clarity and determinacy in their studies and then move slowly towards 
the recognition of conflict, indeterminacy and vagueness. When Mr. 
Bork first looked at original intent, he saw a "naive" attempt to wish 
away the complexities and indeterminacy of the historical record. 
Twenty years later, the same record was entirely clear to him. Consid-
ered as an intellectual progression in interpretive conclusions it seemed 
not impossible, but at least counter-intuitive. Yet if looked at, not as a 
progression of interpretive theory, but as a fundamental change in polit-
ical vision, it makes more sense. From the Burkean point of view, the 
attractive feature of original understanding is not its specious claim to 
"neutrality in derivation and application of principle" but the simple fact 
that it attempts to solve questions of value by focusing on history and 
tradition. 107 
Tradition and history are to be valued for their own sake, not because 
they supply an interpretive constitutional method capable of surmount-
106. SCRUTON, supra note 104, at 189-90. 
107. Actually, there is even Burkean precedent for the specific method of original understanding, 
although the tone of his remarks is more instructive than their content. 
Those who cultivate the memory of our revolution, and those who are attached to the 
constitution of this kingdom, will take good care how they are involved with persons who, 
under the pretext of zeal towards the Revolution and Constitution, too frequently wander from 
their true principles; and are ready on every occasion to depart from the finn but cautious and 
deliberate spirit which produced the one and presides in the other. BURKE, supra note 85, at 86. 
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ing the fact/value dichotomy. History and tradition do not allow us to 
climb out of the web of politics to reach some neutral ground, as the 
liberal would attempt to do. They instead constitute the web. For the 
Burkean, history and tradition are our society and there is no place 
outside of that society to make decisions. Just as Scruton thinks one 
cannot talk about the acceptable level of state intrusion without knowing 
whether we are talking about the traditions of Zulu or American society, 
a Burkean would claim that constitutional interpretation cannot and 
should not seek the illusory haven of a neutral method "outside of" poli-
tics, but should work from within the "prejudice," history, and tradition 
of this society. 
There is an obvious and immediate objection to this view of Mr. Bork's 
work. As I have already shown, his theory rests on a very shaky histori-
cal footing. It could be objected that it is a poor representative of an 
ideology which purports to revere tradition. Perhaps this response mis-
understands the Burkean vision because it continues to apply the 
assumptions of liberal rationalism. Like Mr. Bork, Burke did not have 
much respect for the kind of history most professional historians pro-
duce. Burke believed that individuals and societies could only exist, 
communicate and survive by filtering their present attitudes through the 
traditions, myth, and reverence which colored their history. Thus, it is 
hardly surprising to find that the history Burke uses to defend his ideas is 
an idealized, mythologized, poetic history. He even suggests that, in the 
rare cases when political change is necessary, one can pick and choose 
among the "histories" which one will use for inspiration. In Burke's 
mind, the failure to take this step is the great sin of pride which has 
tainted the French Revolution. 
[Y]ou chose to act as if you had never been moulded into civil soci-
ety, and had every thing to begin anew. You began ill, because you 
began by despising everything that belonged to you. You set up 
your trade without a capital. If the last generations of your country 
appeared without much lustre in your eyes, you might have passed 
them by and derived your claim from a more early race of ancestors. 
Under a pious predilection for those ancestors, your imaginations 
would have realized in them a standard of virtue and wisdom, 
beyond the vulgar practice of the hour: and you would have risen 
with the example to whose imitation you aspired. 108 
Bork, unlike the French Revolutionaries, follows Burke's prescription. 
Searching for a constitutional theory he acquires a "pious predilection" 
for a chosen set of ancestors and imagines "a standard of virtue and wis-
dom, beyond the vulgar practice of the hour." This is not history. It is 
108. Id. at 122 (emphasis added). 
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mythopoeia. But in Burke's world, in Giambattista Vico'sl09 world, and 
perhaps in Mr. Bork's world, mythopoeia is all there is.ll0 
The Burkean history is a chosen history, one that suppresses those fea-
tures of our "ancient liberties" which do not fit the story. One could 
have met Burke on his own ground by pointing out that there were also 
strong English 111 traditions towards egalitarianism and social ico-
noclasm. Equally, there are moments reading Mr. Bork's version of 
American history where one might forget that this is a state born in 
revolution against a colonial power, a state infused with egalitarian as 
well as hierarchical traditions from its very inception. To say this is not 
to say that Mr. Bork's history is false by comparison with some abso-
lutely true, egalitarian, radical republican history of the United States. 
The post-modernist would say that all histories are "chosen" histories, 
and that there is no surcease from the invention and reinvention of our 
past. 
All this leaves us with one overriding question. I suggest that Mr. 
Bork is proposing a reverence towards what amounts to a comprehensive 
mythology predicated on the importance of stability and order. He has 
chosen a mythologized version of the tradition of constitutional govern-
ance, of family life, of "natural" hierarchies, and of the morality of mid-
dle America. If this is true, and if in fact the construction of mythologies 
is inevitable, why is Mr. Bork not more open in urging the Burkean side 
of his ideas?' It is, of course, possible that he is unaware of that side, 
unaware that some of his ideas rely on the premises of liberal rationalism 
while others challenge those premises. The fragmentary way in which 
his Burkeanism appears in his book seems to indicate that this is in fact 
the case. In addition, Mr. Bork may have not wish to face this tendency 
in his thought. What happens if you are a conservative who begins to 
doubt the adequacy of the framework of liberal reason? If you are a 
progressive, then there is a certain satisfaction in breaking down the 
arguments which support the status quo, in showing that history and 
109. G. VICO, THE NEW SCIENCE (M. Fisch & T. Bergin trans. 1968). 
110. This is the point where the post-modem gloss on history may be useful. For the post-
modernist, there is no choice whether or not to be influenced by past history, tradition, style, and 
genre, but there may be a choice of which histories we choose. Where the modernist saw freedom as 
coming from a rejection of the forms provided by the past, the post-modernist sees freedom as 
existing between the opposing pulls of different traditions. The resulting ,collage can produce a wide 
range of effects. Burke deliberately played down the tradition of the Levellers and the Diggers, 
bowdlerized the Glorious Revolution, understated nationalist tensions, and minimized the popular 
attraction of liberal ideals in order to create his history of the great British traditions of government. 
In the hands of a less skilled thinker, his mixture of unreflective royalism, "ancient liberties," natural 
law moralism and utilitarian arguments for private property would have seemed ridiculous. In his 
hands, it acquires an internal coherency akin to the counter-intuitive logic of fairy-tales. For Burke, 
the test of the mixture was its success in fostering stability and order. Yet the same collage approach 
can be used to produce exactly the opposite result. The post-modem building, with its Victorian 
garrets and ItaIianate columns and minaret cupolas, relies on the architectural traditions of the past, 
and yet denies them any absolute authority by juxtaposing them in bizarre and ironic patterns. 
lli. To say nothing of Irish, Scottish, and Welsh. 
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institutional structure are radically under-determined and thus that "the 
way things are" is not inexorable or inevitable. But what if you are a 
conservative? What if you come to realize that your strong suit is preju-
dice rather than reason, mythologized tradition rather than "rational 
progress," unquestioning affection rather than rationally-demonstrated 
legitimacy? Your position, I would suggest, is a difficult one. Almost, in 
fact, a tragic one. 
[T]he conservative who has risen above the fragments of his inheri-
tance and reflected on the desolation that has been wrought in it 
cannot return to an innocence which his own thinking has 
destroyed. He is not in the position of Sartre's existential anti-hero, 
forced to take responsibility for a choice which he lacks the concepts 
to describe. He knows what he wants, and knows the social order 
that would correspond to it. But in becoming self-conscious he has 
set himself apart from things. The reasons that he observes for sus-
taining the myths of his society are reasons which he cannot propa-
gate; to propagate his reasons is to instil the world with doubt. 
Having struggled for articulacy, he must recommend silence. 112 
Perhaps this is the worm at the heart of Mr. Bork's apple. The reasons 
he offers for the philosophy of original understanding are poor ones. Yet 
to offer the reasons I have outlined here is to re-enter the skeptical world 
of rationalist inquiry and thus to threaten the very myths on which he 
would rely. Should he challenge the premises of liberal rationalism 
overtly? Should he offer a post-modern conservatism skeptical of the 
claims of reason, proud of tradition, convinced of the inevitability of 
myth? Or would the propagation of his reasons instil his world with 
doubt? It might well turn his readers away from his solutions to the 
problems of liberalism and towards those who criticize liberalism from 
the left, from faith in equality rather than in hierarchy, towards those 
who revere change as much as Mr. Bork reveres stability. Having strug-
gled for articulacy, Mr. Bork chooses silence. 
CONCLUSION 
What is one to say about Mr. Bork's most recent argument? From the 
more obvious perspectives it is a notable failure. It advocates an histori-
cally-based mode of interpretation, yet the historical groundwork in it is 
poor and sometimes non-existent. It fails markedly to deal with the 
strongest theoretical and practical objections to original understanding. 
Its coverage of contemporary constitutional legal theory, particularly 
conservative legal theory, is cursory and tendentious. The jurispruden-
tial method which forms the heart of the book contradicts Mr. Bork's 
own previous writing, and does not have the virtues he claims for it. 
112. SCRUTON. supra note 104. at 191. 
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Poor history, bad logic, personal inconsistency and a method riddled 
with aporia and contradiction-it is a fairly depressing list of conclu-
sions. The list is made more depressing when it is counterposed against 
the person touchingly revealed by this book, and the scholar revealed by 
his earlier books. It seems that at a certain point Mr. Bork decided no 
longer to listen to those with whom he disagreed, and decided that 
moral, historical and jurisprudential objections to his theories were as 
nothing. He became so firmly fixed in his views that he could not even 
wonder whether or not his ideas, too, were a contentious and political 
litmus test for judges, no matter how right they seemed to him. If true, 
this is a loss to us all, Mr. Bork included. 
Some might agree with this assessment, but would lay the blame for 
the decline in Mr. Bork's scholarship on the trauma of the confirmation 
hearings. The book certainly reveals those hearings to have been a pain-
ful ordeal which, whatever the merits of the objections to Mr. Bork, had 
its own set of unacceptable distortions and mistakes. But in my view the 
process of denial started long before the confirmation hearings. 
There is in all of Mr. Bork's writing an almost frantic insistence that 
the world must be marked out by bright lines. When insistence comes 
into conflict with reality, the result is denial: denial of history, of com-
plexity, of the most cogent objections. Denial of the practice of the 
Supreme Court, of legal academic consensus, of public opinion. Denial 
of practical and theoretical difficulties and, in the end, denial of his own 
past work. The mechanism of denial varies. One can deny the impor-
tance of the consensus of legal academia by attributing it to a complacent 
class interest. "Simplification" allows Dred Scott to become a case which 
discredits only substantive due process and not also original understand-
ing. The practice of the Supreme Court can be separated into heresy and 
correct doctrine and the former decried. The historical evidence of the 
Framers' intention that their understanding should not bind future gen-
erations can simply be ignored. Complexity can be denied by claiming 
that its recognition would start us on the slippery slope to anarchy or 
tyranny. Mr. Bork's own past work may be glossed over quickly. But in 
the end, the denial is undeniable, and it tends to undermine itself. 
When a theory demands that so much of the world be sacrificed to its 
dictates, might it not be the theory, rather than the world, which is in 
error? In this essay, I tried to answer that question by going beyond the 
obvious contradictions and problems of The Tempting of America. 
When that work is set beside Mr. Bork's earlier works, it is clear that all 
of them have a similar theme. On one level, all of them deal with the 
familiar question of liberal rationalist social theory: Can we simultane-
ously believe that all social institutions are subject to the test of reason, 
and believe that values are SUbjective and arbitrary? If our premise is 
that schemes of values cannot be weighed by rational criteria, how can 
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we solve the problems of liberty and order? We have seen that his 
attempts to address these questions have led him through a succession of 
conservative positions. 
On the most obvious level, The Tempting of America is simply the next 
step in this long progression, and the weakest argument so far. The 
Tempting of America is unmarred by complexity or nuance. When faced 
by insoluble problems, the earlier Mr. Bork would try more subtle argu-
ments. This one resorts to bluff and bluster. Yet on another level, The 
Tempting of America is an advance. Each of his previous positions has 
accepted the framework of liberal rationalism and attempted to argue 
within that framework. I have argued in this essay that The Tempting of 
America marks a break, albeit fragmentary and partial, with that tradi-
tion, and turns instead to the older ideas of Burkeanism or forward to a 
post-modern conservatism. 
What is the value of such a turn? One possible answer was prefigured 
in my description of the advantages of originalism as a popular conserva-
tive theory. If conservatives want only a source of rhetoric and weighty 
but spurious argument, original intent and original understanding will do 
fairly well, either alone or in conjunction with other schools of conserva-
tive rhetoric. Consistent Burkeanism may be unnecessary. There may be 
rhetorical advantage to be gained from the language of the other leading 
conservative theories, each of which seems to fulfil the criteria for social 
analysis under the premises of liberalism. Each allows one to claim that 
her political agenda is not merely desirable, but necessary, that it is no 
mere preference, but an inescapable and neutral truth. 
The same pattern holds true at the level of day-to-day politics. Much 
everyday political debate consists of a slinging match between liberals 
who appeal to a reified notion of "progress" and conservatives who 
appeal to an equally reified notion of "the free market." In such a world, 
an openly Burkean, a defiantly post-modern conservative philosophy 
would have at least novelty to recommend it. Instead of conducting all 
political discussion at one remove----aiming at whatever temporary shel-
ter the opponent has constructed to shield herself from the relativity of 
value---one could discuss the political visions themselves. Instead of 
arguing about who has isolated the correct neutral principle guiding our 
busing decision, one could argue about whether integration would help 
or hurt. Instead of coating his arguments with spurious references to the 
true meaning of the history of the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Bork 
could come right out and reason from his faith in tradition, his trust of, 
hierarchies, his unwillingness to disturb the edifice of civil society. I am 
not saying this is somehow the only "real" level of discussion: such a 
claim would be merely to re-enter the eternal minuet of liberal rational-
ism. But I do think that it is a more interesting level of the discussion 
and that claim might convince where metaphysical bludgeons fail. 
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In such a world Mr. Bork would be revealed for the political views 
which undoubtedly commend him now to his conservative friends, and 
which have held constant despite the apparently radical changes in his 
intellectual positions. What are those views? He is an able propagandist 
for a view of society which puts implicit trust in hierarchy. He has a firm 
belief in the "innocence" of social inequality. Partly this is because he 
retains enough of his libertarianism to see a deprivation of freedom only 
where there is an intentional nefarious act by a defined individual actor. 
Wards Cove 113 offers Mr. Bork no particular villain, and thus he sees 
nothing wrong with it. 114 His faith in the "innocence" of social inequal-
ity also springs from a belief that the basic processes of society operate in 
spontaneous good order. If everything is running normally, what could 
be wrong with inequality, even structural inequality? To me, living in a 
city where the nature of someone's life can be predicted with a fair degree 
of accuracy simply by knowing their race, sex, or class, these beliefs seem 
bizarre, crazy even. Mr. Bork's mythologised history is a constant strug-
gle to keep pure the innocent heritage we have been left. My my tho-
logised history is a set of dispersed and occasionally successful attempts 
to apply the idea of democracy to some new social institution-generally 
over the objections of people like Mr. Bork who have argued successfully 
for eons that there are no fewer than seventeen immutable reasons why 
the status quo is simultaneously natural, inevitable and just. 
There are exceptions, however. He seems to advocate intervention to 
maintain a particular vision of morality and family life, without asking 
whether the challenges to it are deliberate or structural. Similarly, his 
tolerance for hierarchy disappears when he talks about the knowledge 
elite rather than the monied elite. His trust in tradition does not extend 
to the peculiarly American traditions of egalitarianism and social ico-
noclasm. Some of these views seem important to me. Most of them seem 
both wrong and pernicious. But if Mr. Bork is the herald of a post-
modem conservatism, we might actually begin to talk about these issues, 
to reveal what conservatism has to offer apart from an unconvincing 
claim to the "true meaning" of history, economics, or institutional com-
petence. Best of all, at long last, the Everyman of conservative legal the-
ory could rest from his lifelong process of denial. 
lB. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
114. See Dork, Justices Did the Right Thing, L.A. Daily J., July 27, 1989, at 6. 
